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Amphibious Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle - Maybe for the SCTF?

Considering the vehicle has a total of 3400 hp on a gross vehicle weight of 75,000 lbs, there is enough power to weight that the craft could have been developed as a hovercraft with wheels (which requires about 25 hp/lb for a surf rateable type).

For all the cost and trouble, would be far easier to just develop one or two sizes of small assault hovercraft or a 15-30 ton payload LCAC that can fold up for stowage on the vehicle deck of American amphibious ships.

It is unlikely we will have an sort of amphibious assault battalion in the intermediate future if ever, so fortunately we will never have to pay a fortune for a really bad idea.
 
T.S.Rea said:
Considering the vehicle has a total of 3400 hp on a gross vehicle weight of 75,000 lbs, there is enough power to weight that the craft could have been developed as a hovercraft with wheels (which requires about 25 hp/lb for a surf rateable type).

For all the cost and trouble, would be far easier to just develop one or two sizes of small assault hovercraft or a 15-30 ton payload LCAC that can fold up for stowage on the vehicle deck of American amphibious ships.

It is unlikely we will have an sort of amphibious assault battalion in the intermediate future if ever, so fortunately we will never have to pay a fortune for a really bad idea.

And why is having an amphibious capability a bad idea? Maybe some information in your profile would help us determine where you are coming from.
 
Never said an amphibious capability would not be useful, the discussion is about the technical aspects of the EFV.  Far easier ways of achieving a superior result.

EFV is driven by arms corporations that primarily want to make money.
 
The Marine Corps has spent 15 years in development of this vehicle. Yes, it's a great concept, but how much is it worth? Fielding of the MRAP vehicle was delayed, in part, to continue developmental funding of the EFV. Meanwhile, Marines were driving around in Iraq with HMMWVs as they main armored vehicle on patrols.

Having an over the horizon capability is important for amphibious operations and the Marine Corps needs to keep its development cycle moving forward. After all, innovation has always been one of the Corps' hallmarks. But there needs to be a balance. I hate to bring this up, but that's the trouble with trying to cut taxes in the middle of a shooting war.

On the other hand, look at the example of the M1, Bradley and Apache. All three systems were lambasted in the media during the 80s as examples of glutted defense spending. I remember one time watching a 60 Minutes expose on the Bradley once while I was a Bradley crewmember. They ripped into the Army about how wasteful the Bradley was and how under protected it was supposed to be. But after serving in a Bradley in combat, I thought it was the best vehicle for our mission. But Desert Storm and subsequent wars have all validated these three fighting systems. What's funny today is that they're called "Legacy Systems" in US Army-speak. (As in: "Legacy of the Cold War.")
 
While the theory of "over the horizon" which drives the EFV and the V-22 programs seems valid, they are 1980's technology and have never really gotten over their teething problems (or seemingly never will in the case of the EFV). Considering it has taken two decades to get this far, maybe people should be given a fresh sheet of paper to redo the concept.

I suspect the desired results could be generated more effectively and possibly at a lower cost with a do-over.
 
Thucydides: You're absolutely right. These things cost so much and the technology is so complex, it takes decades before the thing even sees the light of day. The Osprey is definitely a great example of how NOT to develop a platform.
 
The EFV sure looks cool and deadly with that Mk44 30mm chain gun. It is too bad it is taking so long and so much cash to get it off the ground.
 
And now it seems the program is terminated. The Marine Personnel Carrier mentioned in the article seems to be based on the concepts developed by the LAV family (although it may only be based on the concept and not share much in the way of automotive components).

http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/gates-may-scrap-marines-ship-project-%E2%80%94-as-he-should/?singlepage=true

Gates May Scrap Marines’ Ship Project — As He Should

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is not useful against current and future threats, and should be cut.
May 18, 2010
- by Bob Owens

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has signaled that the long-awaited and seriously over-budget Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) may be the next high-profile project scrapped — the latest in a series of moves meant to streamline the Pentagon’s budget and refocus the military on future challenges.

The EFV, an amphibious armored troop transport, was designed to replace the tired AAV-7A1, a 1970s-era vehicle that has had its service life extended several times as the Marine Corps has sought a replacement.

Both vehicles occupy a specific niche that few vehicles in the world can (or try) to match. They are purpose-designed to transport Marines from the well deck of amphibious assault ships — “swimming” out the back of these massive carrier-like ships and carrying Marines ashore to conduct assaults on defended beaches. Once ashore, the Marine infantry pile out the back of the vehicles to conduct ground operations, while the armored amphibians use their tracks to crawl off the beach and provide close-in and mid-range fire support for the infantry through turret-mounted weapons systems. After the amphibious landing is over and the beach is secured, these tracked vehicles are used much as traditional armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

On paper, replacing the AAV-7A1 with a modernized amphibious troop carrier seems a no-brainer. Such vehicles are closely tied to the image the world developed of Marines in World War II, which saw the use of armored tractors called LVTs. Used from Tarawa onward, the use of amphibious armor became an integral part of Marine Corps doctrine.

But does a doctrine last employed in 1950 still have relevance in today’s world, against current and future enemies, and the expanded use of “smart” weapons systems? Are the millions being invested in the continued development of the EFV being spent to create a vehicle that will best serve current and future Marines?

The theory behind the EFV is that the high-speed planing performance of the craft would enable it to launch amphibious invasions from “over the horizon” — 25 miles out to sea, beyond the range of shore guns and line-of-sight shore-launched missiles that could target the multi-billion dollar amphibious assault ships (and other costly vessels of our modernized, smaller Navy). But the “over the horizon” doctrine that was the rationale behind the EFVs costly and problematic amphibious systems was envisioned during the 1980s. Evolving threats 30 years later include guided artillery and fire-and-forget missile systems that make the EFVs potential sitting ducks long before they ever hit the beach — turning them into seagoing coffins.

Likewise, the evolving threats posed by ship- and shore-launched cruise missiles mean that the 25 miles envisioned for “over the horizon” operations is no longer valid. Naval vessels can now be struck out to 100 miles or more — far beyond the swimming range of the EFV.

It seems clear to many that the doctrine of amphibious invasion on contested shores, refined and perfected during the bloody  campaigns in the Pacific islands, may now be as obsolete as cavalry charges. Advances in defensive weaponry available to our possible adversaries (including non-state actors, as Hezbollah’s strike on the Israeli corvette Hanit proves) have rendered surface assaults from the sea obsolete, as well as surface-swimming amphibious armored vehicles.

If the doctrine of sea-based amphibious operations is now obsolete, what need is there for an armored amphibian for the Marines? Wouldn’t the Marines be best served by an armored vehicle that meets the threats of the 21st century, not hypothetical threats concocted in the last?

If the basic design of the EFV was something that could be salvaged, it might warrant another look, but even the basic design fails against the most common weapons of our current and future adversaries. The flat-bottomed hull that enables the EFV to skim over the waves makes the EFV especially vulnerable to the number-one killer of Marines and soldiers in our two current wars: IEDs and mines. While the Marines claim that the bolt-on kits give the EFV armor comparable to MRAPs, the armor only protects the sides of the vehicle. IEDs and mines are most deadly where they typically detonate under the vehicle, where the flat bottom of the EFV does nothing to dissipate the blast. It is, in short, a Marine killer.

Only institutional inertia and a sense of identity keep the Marines pushing ahead with the EFV. Simple, dispassionate logic dictates scrapping the EFV and starting the search for an alternative from the perspective of a combat-hardened 2010 Marine Corps.

Luckily for today’s Marines, there are options at hand.

A demonstrator version of a medium-armored personal carrier cleverly called the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) is already in development. Meant to compliment the more heavily armed and larger EFV, it nonetheless could perform many of the more common land warfare roles that the EFV might typically face in today’s asymmetrical conflicts and projected asymmetrical threat environments. The MPC concept is similar to the Stryker, another wheeled armored vehicle in the U.S. arsenal already used by the U.S. Army. The upgraded Stryker (LAV-H) might meet Marine needs. The Marines currently use the Stryker’s older “cousin” in the LAV-25 family of vehicles to provide fire support, counter-battery fire, and scouting capabilities.

The hardest part of killing the EFV program for the Marine Corps won’t be the physical shift to a different kind of vehicle and the doctrine to best employ it. It would be the crisis of identity that could result from altering the amphibious assault persona that has been a part of the Corps for almost 70 years. The next generation of Marines may not hit the beach in a modernized version of their great-grandfathers’ LVT, but instead in high-speed, heavily networked vehicles brought ashore by high speed hovercraft. Perhaps even a futuristic submersible APC that gives defenders almost no warning at all before crawling out of the ocean with railguns blazing.

Whatever the future holds for the Marine Corps, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle shouldn’t be part of it, and our Marines are well-served by a secretary of defense willing to overrule generals still trying to fight the last war. Some will focus on Gates’ desire to pare military spending, which in and of itself is an admirable goal. Looking at the systems, however, it seems far more likely that Gates is trying to preserve a far more valuable treasure: the lives of our Marines.

Bob Owens blogs at Confederate Yankee.
 
Having worked in and around the AAV-7 I would say that the Marines are probably happy to not putter around slowly in water, puking their guts out while soaked and reeking like POL.  Stick me on a helicopter please!

On a more serious note - sticking 25 dudes in one vehicle on the ground isn't a good idea anyways - one K-Kill in Iraq killed over 20 guys IIRC.

As well, there is a whole branch of the USMC - the Assault Amphibian Battalions with thier own trade of Officers and Enlisted troops, that will be out of the job.
 
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