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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Scott Taylor is truly being economical with the truth:
http://thechronicleherald.ca/Opinion/978084.html

...Step forward, NATO slackers.

That’s right: As Canada "punches above its weight" in Kandahar, we are not achieving complete success because other NATO countries are failing to do their bit for the alliance. The latest rallying cry of the Canadian tub-thumpers is that Afghanistan is NATO’s Waterloo and that if our partners don’t step up to the plate to win, we should consider cutting short our own commitment.

Two of the most maligned NATO countries accused of shirking their martial responsibilities are France and Germany. What is ironic about Canadians criticizing these particular allies is that as well as contributing significant contingents to Afghanistan (50 per cent more than Canada, in Germany’s case), they are both still heavily engaged in providing security forces in Bosnia and Kosovo [now that's a rich verbal twist: "security forces", implying something like the CF at Kanadahar when in fact the forces in the Balkans are doing traditional peacekeeping without combat--though the clouds are darkening - MC].
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/67913.0.html

While Canada has rushed from flavour-of-the-month conflicts over the past decade, many of our NATO allies have been left manning the less newsworthy but still simmering hot spots.

Canada has chosen to place its military eggs into the one Afghan basket, but we should not be so quick to point fingers and denigrate those countries whose ongoing commitments elsewhere allow us the dubious luxury of being in the front-line spotlight [what tosh, Mr Taylor: those commitments elsewhere in no way preclude those countries from giving their troops a "front-line" role in Afstan].

(staylor@herald.ca)

Scott Taylor is editor-in-chief of the military magazine Esprit De Corps.

What blinking spin.  Mr Taylor should stop making disingenuous excuses and listen to the Danish prime minister; the meaning behind some of his diplomatic phrasing is clear:

Denmark's prime minister on Monday urged other NATO nations to send more troops and money to boost the alliance's operations in Afghanistan.

NATO has some 41,000 troops in Afghanistan, but commanders complain the mission lacks helicopters, mobile units and instructors to train the Afghan army. The alliance also needs more quick-maneuver units to take control of territory won from the Taliban [emphasis added--i.e. combat troops].

"I urge all our partners in NATO to reconsider their contributions to the Afghan mission," Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen told reporters. "I think we need not only more troops, but also more solidarity in the NATO alliance [emphasis added--i.e. get rid of those caveats]."

If alliance members cannot contribute with more soldiers, "it might be possible to provide NATO with funds to finance the operation in Afghanistan," he said.

In September, Denmark increased its contingent in the NATO force in Afghanistan from 440 to some 600 troops. The bulk of the Danes are based in the volatile Helmand province, the scene of some of the heaviest recent fighting.

"The security situation in the southern part of Afghanistan is definitely not satisfactory [emphasis added--"security" here is clearly in context of needing combat-authorized troops]," Fogh Rasmussen said.

Seven Danish troops have been killed in Afghanistan.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Further to my comment here,
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/49908/post-636253.html#msg636253

the Ottawa Citizen published this version of the letter Nov. 13 after some negotiation with the letters' editor:

A cheap shot
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/letters/story.html?id=b4603d4f-ca1c-4d5f-9f07-aec5815a87d5

Re: Keep in mind the soldiers who are yet to die, Nov. 11.

It is fine for columnist Randall Denley to oppose the Canadian Forces' mission in Afghanistan. It is also fine for Mr. Denley to point out that our military, as a result of the Afghan mission, have a bigger budget and a new prominence in the country -- his writing that Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier "is practically treated like a rock star" is a bit of a cheap shot.

What is not fine is to write: "Sure, it's taken a few lives to accomplish all of this, but from the perspective of National Defence Headquarters, the costs have to look pretty modest compared to the gains."

That sentence would be acceptable if Mr. Denley is suggesting that our military leaders consider the the loss of soldiers' lives a regrettable but necessary cost of conducting the Afghan mission -- a mission they have been assigned by both Liberal and Conservative governments.

What Mr. Denley is really suggesting is that the Canadian Forces' senior officers callously consider the deaths as nothing more than the cost of doing business in order to achieve their personal and organizational goals of bigger budgets and more favourable public notice. Suggesting that would be a disgraceful slur on those officers and on Gen. Hillier in particular.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Here is an e-mail I sent:

Mr Denley: I just read your Nov 11 piece, and as a Canadian soldier who has served in Afghanistan, who has many comrades having served there (or who are there now), and who expects to serve there again in due course, I think you are using your bully pulpit rather badly.

Questioning the rationale behind our presence in Afghanistan is fine: so is the desire to see quantifiable results that the average Canadian can understand and evaluate. I have to admit that despite many efforts, many of them by those of us in uniform, our governments have generally done a poor job on either count. Your point: ""...Canadians don't take themselves and their country seriously enough to have an intelligent discussion about our role in the world, but it's time we started." is an excellent one with which most soldiers would agree without much question. I agree fully that rhetoric should not cloud an issue as important as our mission in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, in pursuing that debate you indulged in some pretty questionable pontificating and rhetoric yourself. Not content with casting your vote for the failure of the mission, you got in a few sharp digs at those of us who have the responsibility of leading the men and women of this country who volunteer to serve. I never thought of myself as a bloody handed-careerist climbing up the career ladder on a pile of skulls, but you have certainly enlightened me!

Beyond that sojourn into muck-slinging, you then ventured into an area in which you are quite clearly out of your depth: commenting on foreign policy. To make a silly, distorted statement like:

. We have blundered into a fundamental change in our international role. We're no longer just peacekeepers and aid-bringers. We are now prepared to use our military as a foreign policy tool. We have become the kind of country that invades other countries, for their own good."

reveals a rather weak grasp of fact. Canada has never, to the best of my knowledge, been "just a peacekeeper or aid bringer". Peacekeeping, much to the surprise of many Canadians such as yourself, has never been the primary focus of the Canadian Forces, nor has it been the top priority assigned to us by any Canadian government I have served under since 1974. Up until the early 90's, our primary overseas purpose was to be ready, as part of NATO, to fight the Warsaw Pact. In those days, there were always more Canadian soldiers and equipment stationed in Germany than in all of our contemporary UN missions put together. Our Air Force and our Navy were almost solely focused on NORAD or NATO roles. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and our withdrawal from Germany, the CF participated in combat roles in Iraq and Kosovo, neiither of which was a peacekeeping mission. Our experiences in Croatia and Somalia reminded us that well trained and equipped  combat troops are esssential for any peace support mission other than the most benign. Perhaps that is the reason that the overwhelming majority of my career, as well as that of my peers, has been spent on educating and preparing ourselves to operate in the entire spectrum of conflict, not just the "safe" low end of high-consensus peacekeeping. Not training to be a "peacekeeper" or "aid giver", although we can take those tasks in stride as required. Sadly, having served on a number of these UN peace support missions, I can only attest to the relative ineffectiveness, inefficiency and corrupt wastefulness of many of them, as can numbers of my peers.

As a professional military, we understand far better than most Canadians the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, and admit freely and openly that the long term solutuion can utlimately only arrive through development and diplomacy. But, along the way, varying degrees of military effort will be required to support the other instruments. History and analysis both make this pretty clear. We understand, as Gen Hillier has articulated, that it will be a long haul, but that fact alone neither makes the mission wrong nor cheapens the deaths of our comrades in the way that you so ill-advisedly chose Nov 11 to attempt.


Cheers
 
pbi: Wow.  I'm sending it to the letters' editor, for his information.

Mark
Ottawa
 
excellent letter....very well articulated. It won't change his mind one iota cause people like him have and agenda but if it gets printed it just may get a few other folks thinking,,,well said BZ
 
Thanks. I should have hit spell check before "SEND", but WTF. Articles like his make me angry: which, I suppose, is his objective.

Cheers
 
Are the Canadian Forces' leaders blood-sucking careerists? ;)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/11/are-canadian-forces-leaders-blood.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
It won't change his mind one iota cause people like him have and agenda but if it gets printed it just may get a few other folks thinking,,,well said BZ

If it does get printed - great! - It deserves too.

If it doesn't - It serves another perfectly valid purpose.
Even people with an agenda don't like it when their fiction is pointed out
for what it is. It's pretty clear he has very few supporting facts.

It is my personal quest to do what I can to make writing this kind of.......
flotsam more painful than it's worth. If glaring omissions and errors
are a constant irritant, he might be deterred.  If he is provoked, excellent!
Maybe he'll write something really stupid. ( his column came close)
Or if you believe in miracles( I do ) he and his kind may learn something.

All  the same - my hearty congrats to all who write. ;D

Cheers all!

P.S. I like to write, if only to collect my thoughts and see if I've got
what I think I've got....  ;)
 
Well, until those chimerical extra NATO combat troops show up in any numbers, quite a bit of bombing will be needed though of course it can be done better in some ways.  But, to be realistic, the total number of civilian deaths caused by NATO and coalition forces does not seem all that great in a country of some 25-30 million (though of course civilian fatalities are concentrated in the south and east).

Losing Afghanistan, One Civilian at a Time
Washington Post, Nov. 18, By Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/16/AR2007111601203.html
...
Last year was the worst year for civilian casualties since the fall of the country's cruel Taliban regime, and 2007 is shaping up to be even worse. The most alarming point: As of July, more civilians had died as a result of NATO, U.S. and Afghan government firepower than had died due to the Taliban. According to U.N. figures, 314 civilians were killed by international and Afghan government forces in the first six months of this year, while 279 civilians were killed by the insurgents [emphasis added].

So why on Earth are the NATO and U.S. forces and their Afghan allies killing more civilians than the Taliban? One explanation can be found in the relatively low number of Western boots on the ground. Afghanistan, which is 1 1/2 times the size of Iraq and has a somewhat larger population, has only about 50,000 U.S. and NATO soldiers stationed on its soil. By contrast, more than 170,000 U.S. troops are now in Iraq. So the West has to rely far more heavily on airstrikes in Afghanistan, which inevitably exact a higher toll in civilian casualties. Indeed, the Associated Press found that U.S. and NATO forces launched more than 1,000 airstrikes in Afghanistan in the first six months of 2007 alone -- four times as many airstrikes as U.S. forces carried out in Iraq during that period.

The collateral damage here goes beyond even the tragic loss of life. A September report by the United Nations concluded that Western airstrikes are among the principal motivations for suicide attackers in Afghanistan. Sure enough, suicide attacks in the country rose sevenfold from 2005 to 2006, to an alarming 123 attacks, and are already up by around 70 percent this year -- at the same time that pro-government forces are killing more Afghan civilians than are their Taliban foes...

...According to a countrywide poll by the BBC, the number of Afghans who believe that their country is headed in the right direction dropped a precipitous 22 percentage points between 2005 and 2006, from 77 percent to 55 percent, while the number of Afghans who approve of the U.S. presence in their country eroded from 68 percent to 57 percent. Meanwhile, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly urged NATO and the U.S. military to act with greater restraint. Lately, he has become more impassioned. "Our innocent people are becoming victims of careless operations of NATO and international forces," he said at a news conference in June. That could put the entire Afghan mission in peril.

Of course, the fact that international forces in Afghanistan are causing an unacceptable number of civilian casualties does not exonerate the Taliban insurgents. The fanatics' tactic of using civilians as human shields in combat is well documented and deplorable. But research by Brian Williams, a historian at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, shows that Taliban suicide bombers -- unlike their Iraqi counterparts -- have been generally loath to target civilians, preferring instead to focus on Western and Afghan military personnel and bases.

This tragic trifecta -- a high number of allied airstrikes in Afghanistan, a growing gap between Taliban-caused civilian casualties and those caused by pro-government forces, and declining Afghan support for the international presence in Afghanistan -- means that the rules of engagement for NATO and the United States need to change. In July, de Hoop Scheffer proposed a good first step, announcing that NATO is planning to start using smaller bombs to reduce collateral damage and spare innocent Afghans. NATO is willing to wait for targeting opportunities that don't put civilians at risk, he said: "If that means going after the Taliban not on Wednesday but on Thursday, we will get him then." Moreover, last month, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates urged NATO countries to put more of their soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan. Should that call be heeded -- by no means a certainty -- the influx of troops would also help lessen Western reliance on crude airstrikes [emphasis added]...

Now a pessimistic view from the Senlis Council (note civilian casualities)--hard on NATO allies, not Canada:
http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/277498

The Canadian death toll in Afghanistan rose by two yesterday amid the disclosure of grim new findings that suggest the resurgent Taliban is making dramatic territorial gains in the pivotal struggle for Kandahar.

A majority of Afghans in the embattled southern province believe that Canada's footprint is shrinking as Taliban insurgents "make the rules" of travel through greater swaths of territory, according to a survey conducted by the Senlis Council, one of the few Western research organizations still travelling Kandahar's risk-prone roads.
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/09/afstan-jaw-jaw.html

The widening security gap is matched by an equally disturbing political gap, with a majority of Afghans polled indicating they are losing faith in the fledgling government of President Hamid Karzai, the Senlis research shows.

The findings, disclosed to the Toronto Star ahead of a news conference to be held in London on Wednesday...

In its survey of Afghan views on the continuing struggle against the Taliban, the Senlis Council mobilized its staff of 50 to conduct 1,000 interviews across the country, including 250 in and around Kandahar City. Among the findings:

Armed Taliban checkpoints are becoming more commonplace in areas throughout the province, with a particularly high concentration of Taliban fighters in control of the town of Khakrez [emphasis added], northwest of Kandahar City, since September. Survey respondents also said Taliban recruiters have infiltrated refugee camps in the region.

Afghan residents and shopkeepers have all but evacuated the once bustling road to Lashkar Gar, a key artery leading to neighbouring Helmand province, citing fears of Taliban ambush.

Afghan workers displaced by Taliban encroachment have spilled into Kandahar City in search of day labour, increasing tensions by driving wages down. The current rate for day labour in the area is less than 180 Afghanis, about $3.50 Canadian.

Worsening relations between rival Pashtun tribes have contributed to a further weakening of Karzai's standing in his home province, with some sub-tribes feeling under-represented in the government.

Afghan poll respondents say many families have been terrorized into contributing to both ends of the struggle, placing one son with the Afghan National Army and another with the Taliban.

The Taliban is gaining grassroots political support by cleverly exploiting Afghan anger over civilian casualty counts throughout southern Afghanistan [emphasis added]...

"As we digest this new trove of data, we are putting together a number of recommendations and the biggest one is to point the finger at our NATO allies," MacDonald told the Star in an interview in the Afghan capital.

"It is becoming clear there are insufficient troops to secure Kandahar province. That is not Canada's problem. We've been doing our fair share – many would say more than our fair share.

"So this is not a criticism of the people of Kandahar, or the Karzai government, or the Canadian military. It is the rest of our NATO allies. These countries voted to create stability. Nevertheless, where are they now?"
[emphasis added]..

"But as things stand, we are giving the Taliban a fantastic political opportunity to turn people against us. They are trying very hard to create the impression that Canada and its allies have broken their covenant with the Afghan people. And we need to get with the reality of that.

"The whole point here is that we cannot let Karzai go down in the south. Unless we want to see southern Afghanistan as a geo-political base for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, we just cannot. [emphasis added]"..

More pessimism, from an American living in Kandahar:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/16/AR2007111601204.html

Wednesday, Oct. 31: I woke to the sound of artillery thudding -- like the beat of a heavy heart. It was Afghan army batteries firing into Arghandab, at new Taliban positions there. Through several nights, I had been listening, my ears pricking like a dog's, to the faint popping of gunfire, the clattering of helicopters, the whine of personnel carriers speeding along the roads, falling asleep only when the morning call to prayer rang out in the pre-dawn chill.

I can't explain how this felt, the penetration of war to this crucial part of Kandahar, where I have lived for six years. Arghandab district, with its riot of tangled fruit trees, is the lung of Kandahar province; its meandering, stone-studded river is the artery of the whole region. Arghandab is shade and water, and mud-walled orchards, and mulberries and apricots, and pomegranates the size of grapefruits hanging from the willowy branches...

...The Taliban now owned the whole district of Khakrez, just to the north of Arghandab. They had mined the roads and trapped the police and government officials in the district government building.

We looked at the roads leading down through the mountains, picking out good places for checkposts to stop a Taliban advance. Veteran fighters said each one needed only about 50 NATO soldiers and 200 Afghans. When I went to the local Canadian peacekeepers with the advice, they laughed. The Canadian commander simply didn't have the men [emphasis added]...

All through that day [Oct. 29], the battle lines were drawn: the Taliban north of the Arghandab river bed, government forces to the south. Cars ferried women and children away from the scene of the impending fight. Others, on foot, drove the animals that sustained their families ahead of them as they moved south, toward the city of Kandahar. It was the scene that has come to characterize the tragedies of recent years: poor people, innocent of the decisions that brought about violent events, fleeing ahead of their unfolding.

Only that night was a general council of war convened on the NATO military base outside Kandahar. All the actors were there: the chief of police; the head of the army corps; a representative of the governor, who was away on vacation; the Canadian battle group; the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team; U.S. police trainers and Special Forces officers; the untried son of Mullah Naqib. What a strange task it must have been for the Canadian commander to try to wrest a concerted plan from this company [emphasis added].

On the base the next day, I found a quietly exultant mood of work well done: NATO troops had responded, the Afghan National Army had responded, and some villages had been retaken, with significant Taliban casualties. The beginnings of a noose had been arrayed around the rest.
http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id=960eeac1-dbed-4e7a-b341-855b07fca666

And yet I knew that the significance of this event could not be weighed in the usual quantitative metrics dear to journalists and military men. The number of bodies, the number of houses vacated, the inches of terrain occupied or retaken did not add up to the full reality of what had taken place. That reality was in the hearts of the people, the sinking sense of impending tragedy.

What had in fact transpired, in my view, was a deft, successful psychological operations action by the Taliban. Their attack on Arghandab was designed to communicate, and it did -- eloquently. It said that they are here [emphasis added]...

...these Taliban are not home-grown insurgents. These Taliban, I have become convinced by evidence gathered over the past six years, were reconstituted into a force for mischief by the military establishment -- in other words, it seems to me, the government -- of Pakistan, as a proxy fighting force to advance Pakistan's long-cherished agenda: to control all or part of Afghanistan, directly or indirectly...

...have the Taliban changed their approach to the exercise of power? Not in the least. They still seek to gain control via terror -- by hanging bodies upside-down from trees, by placing pieces of men in gunny sacks like quarters of meat to horrify their neighbors.

So what has changed in six years, except the West's failure to provide a palatable alternative? Is this to be the world's response to that failure? "Oh, we weren't able to do any better for the Afghans than the Taliban, so we may as well bring them back in and get the place off our hands."..

info@arghand.org

Sarah Chayes, a former NPR reporter, runs a local cooperative in Afghanistan.

Sorry for the massive comment, but lot's of food for thought.

Mark
Ottawa
 
...that had in fact transpired, in my view, was a deft, successful psychological operations action by the Taliban. Their attack on Arghandab was designed to communicate, and it did -- eloquently. It said that they are here [emphasis added]...

And I would offer that the ANSF response was "so are we".  Imagine the Afghans doing such an operation a year ago, during Medusa.  They were able to keep the Taliban in that area, though of course they needed help to finish clearing the area.  I was wowed by that when I heard of the ANSF response to the Taliban.


 
Extracted from an On-Line Discussion at the Globe and Mail

I didn't see reference to this exchange on the board.  I believe, given some of my own comments as well as those of others that it deserves an airing.  In it Professor Stein does a very creditable job of explaining her position - a position I think that most here would agree with.

Allan Eizinas, Simcoe, Ont.: Hello, Ms. Stein, thank you for co-writing The Unexpected War. I found it very easy to read and exceptionally informative.

The Afghan war and the Canadian involvement in it has become a very emotional and partisan issue, making it very difficult to glean the bare facts and follow an accurate chronology of events.

I am very uncomfortable with the very large role of the military in initiating our entanglement into this conflict.

The United States has a history of quickly turning over the commanders of their forces — especially when the military gains become questionable.

Why has Canada stayed with the same Chief of Defence Staff for about four years, especially with the Afghan war appearing to have become a stalemate and the "3-D" approach to security (defence, diplomacy, and development) apparently a policy that Gen. Hillier is less than enthusiastic about?

Do you believe that Canada should be in direct negotiations with the Taliban at this time? Do you believe that there is a military solution to this conflict? Do you believe that the Taliban will be a large part of the final political solution that may eventually end this conflict?

What is the fastest way that Canada can extricate itself from a military role in Afghanistan?

Janice Gross Stein: Allan, in Canada, the term of the Chief of the Defence Staff is not fixed and has varied widely over the past two decades.

Gen. Hillier has served as CDS for only 2½ years. He was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff in February 2005. Chiefs usually serve at least three years and often serve a fourth.

They are, of course, appointed by the Prime Minister and serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.

It is not correct for you to say that General Hillier is not a proponent of "3-D."

On the contrary, as we argue in The Unexpected War, Gen. Hillier has been in the lead on 3-D, and his generals have complained bitterly at times that it is the other partners who have not done their share.

In the last six months, Foreign Affairs has been leading a Task Force on Afghanistan which is working to co-ordinate Canada's response on the ground. Things are better, but there is still a way to go.

There is no military solution to this kind of insurgency.

The military's role is to contain the insurgents until the political leadership of Afghanistan can put in place the political institutions, the security institutions — army and especially police — and the economic resources that Afghanistan needs so that popular support swings behind the government and isolates those who use violence to achieve their political objectives.

This is not a short-term project.


Emphasis Added.
 
Janice Gross Stein, CM, FRSC is a Canadian academic
+1

Yes it was a delight to read the discussion she held online at the G&M. This is one academic who knows her stuff and that includes Afghanistan.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janice_Stein
 
A post at The Torch:

Dutch very likely to stay in Afstan until 2010 (and a whole lot more)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/11/dutch-very-likely-to-stay-in-afstan.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Conference of Defence Associations submission to Manley panel (pdf):
http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Policy_Statements/IndepPanelAfghanistanNov2007.pdf

Manley panel in Afstan:
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5hjaNsGAPchmGkHhIJLhsNn7xHl1w

Mark
Ottawa
 
William Arkin of the Washington Post makes a good defence of air power:
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/12/afghanistan_commander_bombs_li.html

Winter came none too soon to Afghanistan this year. The snows and rough weather tend to impede the Taliban and give technological advantage to U.S. and coalition forces. And this year, the most violent since the fall of the Taliban, a momentary respite is especially needed.

One of the main storylines coming out of Afghanistan this year involved civilian casualties from U.S. and NATO airstrikes. It's a storyline the military should be able to counter, but hasn't - which means a win for the Taliban in the information war.

The typical media report reads like this from The Washington Post's Sunday Outlook section:

"Last year was the worst year for civilian casualties since the fall of the country's cruel Taliban regime, and 2007 is shaping up to be even worse. The most alarming point: As of July, more civilians had died as a result of NATO, U.S. and Afghan government firepower than had died due to the Taliban. According to U.N. figures, 314 civilians were killed by international and Afghan government forces in the first six months of this year, while 279 civilians were killed by the insurgents [emphasis added--in a country of 25-30 million!] .

"So why on Earth are the NATO and U.S. forces and their Afghan allies killing more civilians than the Taliban? One explanation can be found in the relatively low number of Western boots on the ground. Afghanistan, which is 1 1/2 times the size of Iraq and has a somewhat larger population, has only about 50,000 U.S. and NATO soldiers stationed on its soil. By contrast, more than 170,000 U.S. troops are now in Iraq. So the West has to rely far more heavily on airstrikes in Afghanistan, which inevitably exact a higher toll in civilian casualties. Indeed, the Associated Press found that U.S. and NATO forces launched more than 1,000 airstrikes in Afghanistan in the first six months of 2007 alone -- four times as many airstrikes as U.S. forces carried out in Iraq during that period."

It's true that there aren't many boots on the ground in Afghanistan. The buzzword among military types there is "under-resourced." At the same time, given the circumstances, the use of air power has been highly effective. It allows NATO a presence in every nook and cranny of the country, denies sanctuary to insurgents and ensures a sustained offensive. Moreover, there's no empirical evidence that air power is more deadly than equivalent ground engagements and no reason to think the civilian protections would be better if there were 400,000 troops on the ground, which is what Army counter-insurgency doctrine calls for.

But few people seem to understand or appreciate what air power affords -- not even, apparently, U.S. commanders.

Here's an exchange from earlier this week between the NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Dan McNeill, and PBS NewsHour's Gwen Ifill.

Ifill: "But some Europeans, who are your allies in this, have said that the air strikes, for instance, are turning Afghans against the NATO forces and causing collateral damage, and that that's not the best strategy."

McNeill: "Well, and, indeed, there is some truth to that. There have been noncombatant deaths, but I would want to point out to all of our listeners the stringent methods that we take to make sure we minimize risk to the Afghan people, as well as their property. And often the insurgent puts out statements about what has occurred that simply is not true. We've been able to refute a number of those. He's a little better at information operations, so to speak, than we are, one, because he feels no compelling need to be accurate. That's not my view. We have to be very accurate with what we say."

Lamenting that the bad guys are just really good at information warfare is evasive and ineffective [emphasis added], but lost in the answer is no understanding by the top commander of air power. The question -- the equivalent of when did you stop beating your wife -- and the answer, admitting a high level of civilian damage and suggesting that indeed air power is responsible (say, for instance, rather than the enemy being responsible or questioning whether it's true in the first place) turns an effective strategy into merely an object of the information war. The Taliban might be controlling the narrative, but it is McNeill's answer that is the enabler.

McNeill should have said: "Gwen, we wouldn't be able to do what we're doing, given how under-resourced we are, if it weren't for air power. It's our asymmetric advantage. And its effectiveness is so frustrating to the enemy that the Taliban's only recourse is to portray it as particularly damaging to civilians. I'm afraid you - and other critics -- are too accepting of the enemy's claims. U.S. and NATO forces are attacking combatants in Afghanistan, and doing the best we can to safeguard civilians in that process."

Of course, for McNeill - an Army man -- to say it, he'd have to understand it. The Air Force needs to get better at telling its story, too.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Before we came the Afghanese civilians were being ruled by the Taliban. Civilians didn't really have rights, living conditions were atrocious and the many horrible atrocities the Taliban have made there during their ruling were grim. Afghanistan was one of the last places anybody wanted to be in. We could've stood by and watched while their lives continued on this course, but no - we took action and made the attempt to stop this injustice. Now we are fighting for the cause of the Afghanese, to rebuild Afghanistan, stabilize their economy and make their lives better. In the midst of it we are taking on casualties for this cause, but that's the consequence of "doing something about it". Fighting injustice often costs something and there isn't any better way to hit the bucket than fighting for something you believe in, and in this case freedom and a good quality of life for the people of Afghanistan. One could argue about collateral damage and so on, but such is a part of the consequences for getting rid of such injustice and for the hard times felt now, there will be a better life for them and their children.

"All that is required for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing"
My favorite quote.


 
TacticalW said:
Before we came the Afghanese civilians were being ruled by the Taliban. Civilians didn't really have rights, living conditions were atrocious and the many horrible atrocities the Taliban have made there during their ruling were grim. Afghanistan was one of the last places anybody wanted to be in. We could've stood by and watched while their lives continued on this course, but no - we took action and made the attempt to stop this injustice. Now we are fighting for the cause of the Afghanese, to rebuild Afghanistan, stabilize their economy and make their lives better. In the midst of it we are taking on casualties for this cause, but that's the consequence of "doing something about it". Fighting injustice often costs something and there isn't any better way to hit the bucket than fighting for something you believe in, and in this case freedom and a good quality of life for the people of Afghanistan. One could argue about collateral damage and so on, but such is a part of the consequences for getting rid of such injustice and for the hard times felt now, there will be a better life for them and their children.

"All that is required for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing"
My favorite quote.

That is really a nice piece of revisionist history you are feeding yourself there but the fact is that we (the world) did sit around and watch the Taleban grind Afghanistan into a societal pulp. 

The only reason we went in was because some very bad men had attacked us from Afghanistan with the knowledge of and acceptance of the Government of Afghanistan.  We didn't really give a rats posterior what the Taleban did in Afgh before that, and the only cause we are really fighting for in Afghanistan now is our self-interest to not have this country used by the bad men again.

Yes, yes it's all very warm and fuzzy to claim that we are there to right the wrongs but if that was really the case and our governments and the world worked like that then we would already have troops in Darfur, the UN would have a standing army and posses a sort of super sovereignty above and beyond that of nations.

I absolutely agree that we are fighting the good fight for the right reasons in Afghanistan, and those reasons include everything you said, but to claim that those ideals are the inspiration and cause of this war is willful self-deception.
 
I think this pretty well ties in with Reccesoldier's thoughts:
http://tinyurl.com/39jp9c ,  New York Times


December 16, 2007
Afghan Mission Is Reviewed as Concerns Rise
By THOM SHANKER and STEVEN LEE MYERS
WASHINGTON — Deeply concerned about the prospect of failure in Afghanistan, the Bush administration and NATO have begun three top-to-bottom reviews of the entire mission, from security and counterterrorism to political consolidation and economic development, according to American and alliance officials.

The reviews are an acknowledgment of the need for greater coordination in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, halting the rising opium production and trafficking that finances the insurgency and helping the Kabul government extend its legitimacy and control.

Taken together, these efforts reflect a growing apprehension that one of the administration’s most important legacies — the routing of Taliban and Qaeda forces in Afghanistan after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 — may slip away, according to senior administration officials.

Unlike the administration’s sweeping review of Iraq policy a year ago, which was announced with great fanfare and ultimately resulted in a large increase in troops, the American reviews of the Afghan strategy have not been announced and are not expected to result in a similar infusion of combat forces, mostly because there are no American troops readily available.

The administration is now committed to finding an international coordinator, described as a “super envoy,” to synchronize the full range of efforts in Afghanistan, and to continue pressing for more NATO troops to fight an insurgency that made this the most violent year since the Taliban and Al Qaeda were routed in December 2001.

“We are looking for ways to gain greater strategic coherence,” said a senior administration official involved in the review process.

One assessment is being conducted within the United States military. Adm. William J. Fallon, commander of American forces in the Middle East, has ordered a full review of the mission, including the covert hunt for Taliban and Qaeda leaders.

“It’s an assessment of our current strategy and how we are doing,” said a senior military officer. “It’s looking at whether we’ve done enough or need to do more in terms of expanding governance and economic development, as well as wrestling with the difficult security issues that we have been dealing with in Afghanistan.”

Senior State Department officials also said that R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs, was coordinating another internal assessment of diplomatic efforts and economic aid — the sorts of “soft power” assistance beyond combat force that officials agree are required for success.

A third review, one that has previously been part of the public discussion, involves the strategy of NATO, which last year assumed control of the security operation in Afghanistan and has since been criticized by American officials and lawmakers for not being aggressive enough.

At an alliance meeting in Scotland on Friday, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates successfully gained a commitment from NATO to produce what senior Pentagon officials called an “integrated plan” for Afghanistan.

“The intent is to get people to look beyond 2008 and realize this is a longer-term endeavor,” said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, who was with Mr. Gates in Scotland. He said the plan would “start off by acknowledging the success we’re having in terms of reconstruction and education and governance and so forth, but it also will state where we want to be in three to five years, and how we get there.”

The NATO assessment is to be completed for a meeting of alliance heads of state in Bucharest, Romania, next spring. The other reviews are due early next year.

Publicly, administration officials have expressed optimism that the war in Afghanistan can be won, but Mr. Gates told Congress this week that his optimism was “tempered by caution.”

In recent months, though, Mr. Bush’s senior advisers have expressed a growing unease.

While there is a sense that this year’s troop buildup in Iraq has turned around a dire situation, the effort in Afghanistan has begun to drift, at best, officials said. That prompted Mr. Bush’s national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, to oversee internal deliberations that resulted in the push for the new reviews.

The NATO-led security assistance mission in Afghanistan has about 40,000 troops; of those, 14,000 are American. Separately, the United States military has 12,000 other troops in Afghanistan conducting specialized counterterrorism missions.

Mr. Gates has declined to name specific allies that have not fulfilled pledges for combat troops, security trainers and helicopters for Afghanistan, or whose governments have placed restrictions on their combat forces. But he has noted that Britain, Canada and Australia had met their commitments and carry their full combat load.

Some members of Congress have not been so diplomatic.

“The Germans, the Spanish, the Italians don’t send any troops to the south except for 250 troops by Germany,” said Representative Joe Sestak, Democrat of Pennsylvania. A retired three-star admiral who worked on the staff of the National Security Council in the 1990s, Mr. Sestak complained that some allies “refuse to do combat ops at night and some don’t fly when the first snowflake falls.”

As part of the NATO review, alliance diplomats and military officers are closely watching the actions of Britain, which may be able to commit additional troops to Afghanistan as it reduces its deployments in Iraq.

To that end, Britain has opened its own “strategic review” of the Afghan mission, especially in the turbulent southern provinces, which will shape the alliance’s assessment, according to a senior diplomat of a NATO nation.

“Essentially what’s driving it is that a year ago, we were regarding Afghanistan as an outstanding success — we established democracy, we were in control of many parts of the country,” the NATO diplomat said. “Now we have significant issues with certain areas producing opium and the Taliban coming back in certain parts of the country, as well.”

The Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri, was more direct in assessing possible failure in Afghanistan.

“I have a real concern that given our preoccupation in Iraq, we’ve not devoted sufficient troops and funding to Afghanistan to ensure success in that mission,” Mr. Skelton said. “Afghanistan has been the forgotten war.”

Strained by commitments in Iraq, the American military has few troops available to expand its forces in Afghanistan. “It is simply a matter of resources, of capacity,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress this week. “In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must.”

Both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Mr. Gates have urged Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, to consider proposals for eradicating poppy fields by aerial spraying to halt the rapid increase in opium production. But the Afghan president has thus far rejected the idea, and even American officials admit that vastly increased eradication efforts would be counterproductive unless alternative livelihoods were immediately available to the poppy farmers.

The Karzai government also is said to be reluctant to endorse having an international coordinator with expanded powers, fearing its own legitimacy and credibility could be undermined.

Julianne Smith, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the mission in Afghanistan was at risk of failure, as political support in European capitals strained NATO’s ability to sustain, let alone expand its effort there.

“The mission in Afghanistan has been suffering from neglect on all sides,” she said.


 
TacticalW said:
Before we came the Afghanese civilians were being ruled by the Taliban. Civilians didn't really have rights, living conditions were atrocious and the many horrible atrocities the Taliban have made there during their ruling were grim. Afghanistan was one of the last places anybody wanted to be in. We could've stood by and watched while their lives continued on this course, but no - we took action and made the attempt to stop this injustice. Now we are fighting for the cause of the Afghanese, to rebuild Afghanistan, stabilize their economy and make their lives better. In the midst of it we are taking on casualties for this cause, but that's the consequence of "doing something about it". Fighting injustice often costs something and there isn't any better way to hit the bucket than fighting for something you believe in, and in this case freedom and a good quality of life for the people of Afghanistan. One could argue about collateral damage and so on, but such is a part of the consequences for getting rid of such injustice and for the hard times felt now, there will be a better life for them and their children.

"All that is required for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing"
My favorite quote.

As Reccesoldier has said... with small change....
we are in Afghanistan for the following reasons:
1.  People from inside Afghanistan & with support of Taliban gov't attacked one of our closest allies & as per our NORAD/NATO obligations, we came to their defence.  We took our fight to the ennemy.
2.  The US & us found that there was such a thing as the "Northern alliance that was fighting the Taliban.  We supported the Northern alliance & with their support, Afghanistan's Taliban gov't was overthrown.  The NA appointed a gov't and following a Loya Jirga (Tribal Grand Council) the Karzai government was elected & vetted as the legitimate government of the Afghan people.
3.  The Karzai Gov't has asked NATO for armed help to stabilize his country & aid them in ridding Afghanistan of it's terrorist Taliban.
 
TacticalW said:
Now we are fighting for the cause of the Afghanese, to rebuild Afghanistan, stabilize their economy and make their lives better.

They are called Afghans by the way.

Afghanis (which you spelled incorrectly)is the name of their currency.

You may want to include that in your revisionist diatribe next time.

Regards
 
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