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Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

The Mission Bay on the CSC is essentially an aluminum shed covering the Main Deck and housing an Overhead Traveling Crane.

Just a small technical point, Kirkhill: It is a steel shed (actually, a little more complex than a shed). We abandoned the use of aluminum as a result of the Falkland war: too combustible when in the fire resulting from missiles hit.
 
Point taken but is it insurmountable?

As I understand it the AOPS has attachments on both the cargo deck and the flight deck, with power, for sea cans. The Dane's Stanflex systems have standardized power and water fittings. The US has successfully launched weapons from TEUs secured to the deck of an OSV and the flight deck of an LCS.

As to the risk of some weapons in the container being NS, if they don't interfere with the firing of the adjacent weapons the aren't we looking at the comparative risk of 1 in 100 failures vs the benefit of rapidly loading 60 ready to launch SAMs in a TEU-20? Or adding 4 VLS cells in a TEU-40?

I was not commenting on the complexity of the task, I was commenting on your view that there is a time advantage. It is only that time required for reload, that I saw as not necessarily being right. Again, I don't know if there would be such advantage or not.
 
It would not a simply cutting a capability, but your making a trade off to lose one aspect but enhance another. I’m not suggesting that be done for all of the CSC, but it does seem to potentially be a decent option for a small portion of them. Again if your intent is to fit into a NATO flotilla, you probably don’t need all the missiles, but if you are sending off 2-3 ships to do something RCN only, maybe having extra missiles available on one of those isn’t a bad idea.
My opinion with this is that you are effectively bring the same issue up as we dealt with when the RCN decided to leave behind a split GP and AAW specification for the CSC, instead leaning into a single homogenous specification set. If you convert a handful of CSC's to remove the mission bay and replace it with VLS, you are going to be dealing with the same availability issues that most navies with small fleets of specialist AAW vessels have. You'd need to convert 2-3 (or more) ship to make sure you'll always have 1 AAW variant available, then you have two separate coasts to add into the equitation. Seems like you'd end up cutting a fair few of the CSC's mission bay capability out and I don't think that is especially wise.

None that I am aware of. So far, the various models of the CSC's have tended to go towards the "lesser capable" first batch that Admiral Topshee has mentioned as required in order to get them on time. Unlike Australia and the UK, in Canada we haven't had any apparent "conversation" about improving or increasing the capability of future versions yet, or about what such improvement/increase might look like.

I am not opposed to the idea of having a multi-mission bay, but I wonder if it isn't there just so we can fight the last war, again. In the Gulf War, boarding parties to inspect suspect vessels was a big part of the job, but is it likely to be part of the next one? I don't think so. That reduces the usefulness of the MMB. I know it could house a second helicopter, but unlike the 280's where they were side by side in the hangar, with direct access to the flight deck for both, I don't know how useful a one behind the other configuration would be (need someone from MH world to comment here). Same goes for using it for UAVs. I can see the bay being used for the upcoming unmanned independent minesweeping/hunting systems, but even though with such systems the mothership is not entering the minefield, it is overkill to use a high end frigate as a mothership.

All this to say that, considering what we are seeing now as a development in naval warfare, where in coastal and near-coastal waters drones are becoming a big thing, perhaps the best use of that space is to convert to extra missiles for close air defense.
The multi-mission bay is a hedge to allow the ships to take on the future developments and implementation of unmanned systems alongside bringing some much needed variety to the roles the class can undertake. Without the mission bay, the CSC only has a single boat bay on the port side. Taking out or cutting down the bay will have some major knock on effects for what the CSC can do now that it lacks any kind of small boat capability, drug interdiction and piracy control are two I'd point out. It would also pretty heavily remove any ability to do more covert operations like supporting CANSOFCOM operations with a platform that isn't an AOPS or a JSS. Being able to support mine warfare using unmanned systems is something that shouldn't be an explicit role but it is definitely something that could be useful, look at the 280's back during the Gulf War. Being able to do humanitarian work at home or abroad with that cargo capability and the ability to offload its own cargo is something else that is very useful, we've sent 280's and Halifax's to do these sorts of roles in the past and CSC will be able do exceed their limited capabilities by leaps and bounds.

The primary purpose I see for the mission bay is its ability to incorporate unmanned systems to supplement the ASW capability of the CSC significantly. Having this ability could be absolutely key going forward as these unmanned systems further develop. Other nations without this kind of mission bay could be stuck holding the bag with their legacy designs. This class will be the backbone of the RCN going forward, I expect to see them used sometimes in roles where they might be overkill but we've done that plenty with our current frigates. I would be cautious to not overly analyze current trends and developments, we are very much in the part of the arms race where the "disruptive technology" has the head start and developments from the other side have been somewhat slow. There are systems and ways for CSC to potentially harden itself against unmanned systems without something as drastic as the removal of the mission bay.

The image below showcases roles and equipment that the RN thinks will be useful for employment of their own mission bay equipped Type 26's, I don't think we should ignore of wave off the utility of such a system at this point. Weapons are something attractive to the point people can miss the more important but less glamorous capabilities a ship has.

image0 (1).png
 
Just a small technical point, Kirkhill: It is a steel shed (actually, a little more complex than a shed). We abandoned the use of aluminum as a result of the Falkland war: too combustible when in the fire resulting from missiles hit.

Fair comment. Thanks.

Given that isn't it equally true to say it is a low density, low mass space and the steel panels add to the sail area which may impart more lateral forces than the mass of a TEU-40 mounted on the weather deck or even at the height of the mission bay roof?
 
My opinion with this is that you are effectively bring the same issue up as we dealt with when the RCN decided to leave behind a split GP and AAW specification for the CSC, instead leaning into a single homogenous specification set. If you convert a handful of CSC's to remove the mission bay and replace it with VLS, you are going to be dealing with the same availability issues that most navies with small fleets of specialist AAW vessels have. You'd need to convert 2-3 (or more) ship to make sure you'll always have 1 AAW variant available, then you have two separate coasts to add into the equitation. Seems like you'd end up cutting a fair few of the CSC's mission bay capability out and I don't think that is especially wise.


The multi-mission bay is a hedge to allow the ships to take on the future developments and implementation of unmanned systems alongside bringing some much needed variety to the roles the class can undertake. Without the mission bay, the CSC only has a single boat bay on the port side. Taking out or cutting down the bay will have some major knock on effects for what the CSC can do now that it lacks any kind of small boat capability, drug interdiction and piracy control are two I'd point out. It would also pretty heavily remove any ability to do more covert operations like supporting CANSOFCOM operations with a platform that isn't an AOPS or a JSS. Being able to support mine warfare using unmanned systems is something that shouldn't be an explicit role but it is definitely something that could be useful, look at the 280's back during the Gulf War. Being able to do humanitarian work at home or abroad with that cargo capability and the ability to offload its own cargo is something else that is very useful, we've sent 280's and Halifax's to do these sorts of roles in the past and CSC will be able do exceed their limited capabilities by leaps and bounds.

The primary purpose I see for the mission bay is its ability to incorporate unmanned systems to supplement the ASW capability of the CSC significantly. Having this ability could be absolutely key going forward as these unmanned systems further develop. Other nations without this kind of mission bay could be stuck holding the bag with their legacy designs. This class will be the backbone of the RCN going forward, I expect to see them used sometimes in roles where they might be overkill but we've done that plenty with our current frigates. I would be cautious to not overly analyze current trends and developments, we are very much in the part of the arms race where the "disruptive technology" has the head start and developments from the other side have been somewhat slow. There are systems and ways for CSC to potentially harden itself against unmanned systems without something as drastic as the removal of the mission bay.

The image below showcases roles and equipment that the RN thinks will be useful for employment of their own mission bay equipped Type 26's, I don't think we should ignore of wave off the utility of such a system at this point. Weapons are something attractive to the point people can miss the more important but less glamorous capabilities a ship has.

View attachment 83207

If I look at the Humanitarian aid / Disaster relief configuration I see 5x 2 ISO-20 (TEU-20) sea cans adjacent to a RIB. To me that suggests that that mission bay could contain 6 to 8 TEU-40 containers. If those containers were open to the sky then they could be Mk 70 Payload Launch Systems meaning the addition of 24 to 32 VLS cesll on a temporary basis. The space could add, as an optional capability, 24 to 32 Tomahawks or SMs, or 96 to 128 ESSMs or CAMMs. Not to mention mass quantities of NSMs, JAGMs or SeaKnights.

The Ventilation problem would be solved by opening the doors on either side. Could the deck over the Mission Bay be configured with removable deck plates or hatch covers?
 
My opinion with this is that you are effectively bring the same issue up as we dealt with when the RCN decided to leave behind a split GP and AAW specification for the CSC, instead leaning into a single homogenous specification set. If you convert a handful of CSC's to remove the mission bay and replace it with VLS, you are going to be dealing with the same availability issues that most navies with small fleets of specialist AAW vessels have. You'd need to convert 2-3 (or more) ship to make sure you'll always have 1 AAW variant available, then you have two separate coasts to add into the equitation. Seems like you'd end up cutting a fair few of the CSC's mission bay capability out and I don't think that is especially wise.


The multi-mission bay is a hedge to allow the ships to take on the future developments and implementation of unmanned systems alongside bringing some much needed variety to the roles the class can undertake. Without the mission bay, the CSC only has a single boat bay on the port side. Taking out or cutting down the bay will have some major knock on effects for what the CSC can do now that it lacks any kind of small boat capability, drug interdiction and piracy control are two I'd point out. It would also pretty heavily remove any ability to do more covert operations like supporting CANSOFCOM operations with a platform that isn't an AOPS or a JSS. Being able to support mine warfare using unmanned systems is something that shouldn't be an explicit role but it is definitely something that could be useful, look at the 280's back during the Gulf War. Being able to do humanitarian work at home or abroad with that cargo capability and the ability to offload its own cargo is something else that is very useful, we've sent 280's and Halifax's to do these sorts of roles in the past and CSC will be able do exceed their limited capabilities by leaps and bounds.

The primary purpose I see for the mission bay is its ability to incorporate unmanned systems to supplement the ASW capability of the CSC significantly. Having this ability could be absolutely key going forward as these unmanned systems further develop. Other nations without this kind of mission bay could be stuck holding the bag with their legacy designs. This class will be the backbone of the RCN going forward, I expect to see them used sometimes in roles where they might be overkill but we've done that plenty with our current frigates. I would be cautious to not overly analyze current trends and developments, we are very much in the part of the arms race where the "disruptive technology" has the head start and developments from the other side have been somewhat slow. There are systems and ways for CSC to potentially harden itself against unmanned systems without something as drastic as the removal of the mission bay.

The image below showcases roles and equipment that the RN thinks will be useful for employment of their own mission bay equipped Type 26's, I don't think we should ignore of wave off the utility of such a system at this point. Weapons are something attractive to the point people can miss the more important but less glamorous capabilities a ship has.

View attachment 83207
I was trying to figure out how to upload that image! I think that we will find that the mission bay could be quite useful and that our allies might appreciate it as well.
Although I thought I read that even with the mission bay swap out there would be room for the rib?
While an extra 8 NSM and 64 VLS is very exciting it doesnt have to be the only solution to go full out understanding that the temptation is there once one removes the MB but perhaps there is an advantage to adding less than the 64? For sure in weight
 
Just a small technical point, Kirkhill: It is a steel shed (actually, a little more complex than a shed). We abandoned the use of aluminum as a result of the Falkland war: too combustible when in the fire resulting from missiles hit.
Ships in the Falklands didn't have issues because of aluminum use, that is misinformation that persists even to this day it seems.
 
As I understand it, both the UK and US are using different vessels for different tasks. Canada does not have that luxury so it means our CSC must be more dual purpose than the other navies.

UK = Type 26 primary a ASW ship with AD (Type 45.26,31)
Aussies = Hunter Class primary a AD ship with some ASW capability
Canada = CSC (as currently designed) roughly a 60/40 split between AD and ASW

Would that be a correct statement?
 
Ships in the Falklands didn't have issues because of aluminum use, that is misinformation that persists even to this day it seems.
Hard to blame sinking of HMS Sheffield on "burning aluminum" when:

a) HMS Sheffield was all steel construction (hull and superstructure), not aluminum, and
b) Aluminum doesn't "burn". At high heat it will deform or melt but it will not combust.
 
As I understand it, both the UK and US are using different vessels for different tasks. Canada does not have that luxury so it means our CSC must be more dual purpose than the other navies.

UK = Type 26 primary a ASW ship with AD (Type 45.26,31)
Aussies = Hunter Class primary a AD ship with some ASW capability
Canada = CSC (as currently designed) roughly a 60/40 split between AD and ASW

Would that be a correct statement?
I dont know about that
The UK and AUS already have AAD capability with the 45's and Hobarts
Arguably the CEAFAR and Spy7 should be way more capable than Artisan but would love to read someones breakdown on that
UKAUSCAN
seaceptor48024
mk41243224
NSM088
torpedo044
30mm222
20mm CIWS220

so no torpedoes or NSM/Harpoon for the UK
no CIWS for Canada
no Seaceptor for AUS
we have 24 less Seaceptor than the UK and
8 less MK41's than AUS but 6x4 SeaCeptor which sorta closes the gap
all have an ultra hull mounted sonar and the UK and AUS have a Thales towed array whereas we went with a Ultra
 
I don't know if the actual issue is combustion or melting. All I know is that "no more aluminum superstructures" was a Falkland lesson learned and no "Royal" navies has used aluminum in its shipbuilding since.

The problem, in any event, was not observed as a result of SHEFFIELD's demise, but rather as a result of the demise of ARDENT and ANTELOPE, both type 21 frigates.

Interestingly, the type 21's were of a civilian yard design (Vosper Thornicroft) rather than the usual DoD in house design because the yards convinced the Government that they could do better for cheaper with their own design and the 21's were a quick, cheap, stop gap measure to bring the total number of frigates up while waiting for the type 22 to arrive. Sound familiar - type 31 - cough! cough!
 
Melting at 660°C certainly isn’t a good structural thing in a fire.
 
I don't know if the actual issue is combustion or melting. All I know is that "no more aluminum superstructures" was a Falkland lesson learned and no "Royal" navies has used aluminum in its shipbuilding since.

The problem, in any event, was not observed as a result of SHEFFIELD's demise, but rather as a result of the demise of ARDENT and ANTELOPE, both type 21 frigates.

Interestingly, the type 21's were of a civilian yard design (Vosper Thornicroft) rather than the usual DoD in house design because the yards convinced the Government that they could do better for cheaper with their own design and the 21's were a quick, cheap, stop gap measure to bring the total number of frigates up while waiting for the type 22 to arrive. Sound familiar - type 31 - cough! cough!
"The sinking of Sheffield is sometimes blamed on a superstructure made wholly or partially from magnesium-aluminium alloy, the melting point and ignition temperature of which are significantly lower than those of steel. However, this is incorrect as Sheffield's superstructure was made entirely of mild steel. The confusion is related to the US and British navies abandoning aluminium alloys after several fires in the 1970s involving USS Belknap and HMS Amazon and other ships that had aluminium alloy superstructures.[35][a] The sinking of the Type 21 frigates Antelope and Ardent, both of which had aluminium alloy superstructures, probably also had an effect on this belief, though these cases are again incorrect and the presence of aluminium alloy had nothing to do with their loss.[36][37]"

36. Crum, Kyle A.; McMichael, Jerri; Novak, Miloslav. "Advances in Aluminum Relative to Ship Survivability" (PDF). navalengineers.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 December 2014. Retrieved 16 June 2015.
37. ^ "Aluminum Hull Structure in Naval Applications" (PDF). AUSTAL. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 November 2011. Retrieved 16 June 2015.
 
Ultra is better than Thales?
Anecdotally, I uderstand that the Canadian LFA/VDS has always been an excellent performer. RAN also put Ultra on the Hobart. Thales CASTAS is a popular seller in the European market and will also be fitted to the USN FREMMs. Then again, I’m not an acoustician even though I’ve stayed serval times at a HolidayInn Express, so YMMV
 
Anecdotally, I uderstand that the Canadian LFA/VDS has always been an excellent performer. RAN also put Ultra on the Hobart. Thales CASTAS is a popular seller in the European market and will also be fitted to the USN FREMMs. Then again, I’m not an acoustician even though I’ve stayed serval times at a HolidayInn Express, so YMMV
The Canadian Acoustics gear and software both tend to be world beaters.

It is something that we still do very well.
 
People complaining on Facebook about the cost of the CSC and not actually knowing what the NSS is, sigh.
 
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