Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[daftandbarmy]

JBLM just keeps getting better…new and improved, best shitters in the Army.

Well played aviators of D-Coy, 2-158th Combat Aviation Brigade, well played!

These Army pilots poop in luxury at Joint Base Lewis-McChord

Army Times exclusively interviewed the former infantry NCO who masterminded the luxury latrine.

www.armytimes.com

My abiding memory of the 600m gallery ranges at Yakima was:

1) A porta potty at the right hand edge of each 100m firing point

2) Bullet holes in all the porta potties from 500m on down

 

[Brad Sallows]

At the other end of the slider, a portable apparently abandoned in the training area for months. There are no words.

 

[Kirkhill]

I can't tell you how many times, over a couple of decades, that I tried to pitch things like that only to fail on the horns of mediocrity.

After awhile I stopped trying as it just wasn't worth the time and effort to fail continuously, especially for a part timer with a busy 'outside the Army' life.

You would think there are no places in this world where people live in the mountains and forests.

 

[FJAG]

I would ask those who advocate sharing LAVs, or any A Fleet, if they've ever managed the training on and maintenance of an A Fleet.

Yes. An M109 battery for three years. And as I've said before, my maint det were my favourite people. In fact our battery had two maintenance dets, one in Shilo looking after our set of 6 x M109s, 6 x M548s, 2 x M577s, 1 x M578, 6 x M113s, and 18 wheeled vehicles and another one in 4 CMBG looking after our duplicate flyover operational set.

IMHO, if you have a core of dedicated maintenance personnel looking after the equipment full-time, provide sufficient time between training cycles for the equipment to be inspected and maintained, and share it between the same operational sets of crews during a year, it should be possible. Again, if two battalions share one set of training vehicles there should be two sets of maintainers to look after them or alternatively it allows for one set of equipment to be shared for training and one set operationally prepositioned and used on flyover exercises with a set of maintainers for each.

It's obviously not the preferred solution (and not just because of the wear and tear on the equipment but because of the limited amount of the force that can deploy operationally at any given time), and I must admit my experience with this was during a period of time when maintenance detachments were fully manned and parts flowed with acceptable rapidity. (I recall one spring exercise where poplar fluff ended up choking air intakes and the regiment blew multiple power packs on the guns in rapid succession before we realized what was going on. They were all replaced during the course of the exercise.)

I've noted comments by many on this forum about the lack of maintainers and parts. I really can't understand how an army that has vast quantities of A Fleets can allow that type of condition to happen much less exist for as long as it has. I've noted several Auditor General reports and CRS reports that comment on what appears to be an ongoing weakness.

I certainly appreciate the point that you are making but most of Canada's operational missions involve the LAV6 and now our handful of M777s and Leopards and TAPVs and only roughly 2/3 of the RegF units have this equipment while the ResF has next to zero. However, one needs to do something to ensure everyone is adequately trained. One won't always have time for three-year (or even two-year) MRS cycles and six months of pre-deployment training.

Like @KevinB points out, it becomes a matter of how organized and coordinated the use and maintenance of equipment sets are handled. A sine qua non is that the Army's maintenance structure needs to be robust and a priority above all else. Among the many lessons that seem to be popping out of the Ukraine is the one that badly maintained equipment and poor logistics result in excessively high vehicle and personnel casualty rates.

 

[Infanteer]

What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group. This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites. This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.

This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities. I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.

Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points. There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in. In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available. The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag." Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.

 

[KevinB]

What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group. This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites. This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.

This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities. I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.

Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points. There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in. In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available. The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag." Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.

As I said before, the only time I see it working is for the PRes - with a full reg force cadre of maintainers, and realistically some OEM Tech Support and Contractors.

1 Weekend Ex/Training - gets turned in and worked on during the week, rinse and repeat, with a reg force cadre vehicle "owner" who stays with the Reservists in the vehicle - they have the pride of ownership/responsibility to ensure it is not treated like crap and stuff doesn't walk away.



I don't see it working very well for regular force units -- unless the "use" period was limited and 3-4 days allocated to hand over each time.
And frankly your Reg Force should have enough equipment they don't need to play musical chairs.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Shared fleets are bad. Bad bad bad. Bad. You can try to do long-terms swaps of equipment when a given unit goes on a long deployment and its gear is left behind, but its a painful shell game.

The wheel has gone around a few times on this - circa 2005 the army redistributed vehicles to achieve a BG worth at CMTC and a BG worth ready to sail from Montreal. Result - units stripped of vehicles. A few years later the flow was starting to go the other way.

As an OC my troops had their own Coyotes, LUVWs and Bisons. They were always doing something with them. Sometimes the equipment was called away to CTC to support courses - at least that was a controlled handover as part of a somewhat rational plan.

 

[KevinB]

Shared fleets are bad. Bad bad bad. Bad. You can try to do long-terms swaps of equipment when a given unit goes on a long deployment and its gear is left behind, but its a painful shell game.

The wheel has gone around a few times on this - circa 2005 the army redistributed vehicles to achieve a BG worth at CMTC and a BG worth ready to sail from Montreal. Result - units stripped of vehicles. A few years later the flow was starting to go the other way.

As an OC my troops had their own Coyotes, LUVWs and Bisons. They were always doing something with them. Sometimes the equipment was called away to CTC to support courses - at least that was a controlled handover as part of a somewhat rational plan.

Agreed for the Reg Force.

The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.

And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

Agreed for the Reg Force.

The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.

And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.

My only problem with that is that if the government bought additional vehicles for the Reserves the Regs would snaffle them so everybody got their own personal LAV.

 

[Kirkhill]

And what's a personal LAV without a bidet?

 

[FJAG]

What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group.

True. But your question only addressed the issue of having managed an A Fleet and that was all part of it. The point to the battery in 4 CMBG was that it was used roughly one month a year on a flyover exercise. It could easily have been used by other batteries from other Canadian regiments for several additional exercises each year without creating a serviceability issue.

The same way with our battery in Canada. Basically the guns were used for two to three exercises a year and a driver heavy tracked course. We never did basic gun number training with them - at the time that was an RCAS function - and never used them for training reservists - which we had plenty of time for but never did. Basically they stood idle for in excess of half of the year.

This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites. This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.

This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities. I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.

But effectively the Army did share equipment in Afghanistan where every six months a new battle group did a RIP on the in-theatre gear where it was used harder than any Canadian gear. We're doing it now in Latvia as well in what is basically a training environment. Much of ensuring that equipment is properly maintained by its crew rests with the NCMs and line officers.

Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points. There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in. In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available. The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag." Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.

I absolutely believe that it's difficult and can lead to difficulties especially if its done in an unmanaged "jumped in" or "hop in" manner. I don't think anyone here is suggesting that method.

What we're trying to achieve is a way of solving several problems with limited gear. One is how to gather together enough equipment for a pre-positioned flyover force and the other is how to properly train ResF members on the gear they are expected to use. All of that in the absence of a large purchase of new equipment. A managed system of shared equipment is really the only viable option. Except of course the option which we've had for decades where a large part of the Army has had somewhere between limited to very limited equipment to train with.

I'm open to other COAs.

 

[McG]

We're doing it now in Latvia as well in what is basically a training environment.

It does not get a lot of attention because it’s less flashy than shooting bullets or blanks but that equipment in Latvia has been rotated out several times because it has been driven hard and gotten worn.

We rent a ship, swap out the whole A or B fleet in one go, then bring the used stuff home to go through an R&O pipe. It is effective, but it is not an efficient way to run the army in garrison.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed for the Reg Force.

The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.

And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.

We already excel at deploying to the Assy Area by low flying rental bus, so we're good to go I think

 

[Kirkhill]

What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group. This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites. This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.

This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities. I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.

Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points. There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in. In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available. The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag." Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.

4x MBT
6x LAV Recce
13x LVTP-7
28x LUV
6x 155mm Towed

4x AH
4x UTTH-Cmd
12x UTTH
4x MHLH

Canadianized.

4x Leo2
6x LAV Recce
13x LAV
28x LAV
6x 155mm Towed

4x CH-146 (Gun-ERSTA)
4x CH-146 (Cmd)
12x CH-146
4x CH-147

I'm sure you recognize it. And I believe we have the kit to duplicate it.

It would mean tossing out some standards - like not penny-packeting tanks.

On the other hand 5 suites of Ground Vehicles and 3 suites of Air Vehicles

5x 4 = 20 of 80 Leos
5x 6 = 30 of 66 LAV-LRSS
5x 41 = 205 of 651 LAV
5x 6 = 30 of 33 M777s (need to ask nicely to get another 24 and maybe a dozen HIMARs)

3x 20 = 60 of 85 Griffons
3z 4 = 12 of 17 Chinooks

We would win some on the swings and lose some on the roundabouts but with our kit available we could easily produce 5, and maybe 6, equivalent Teams and still have enough left over for a proper Tank Regiment and a Recce Squadron. Then we just need to kit out the artillery properly.

 

[KevinB]

The Griffon isn’t a AH-1Z nor a UH-60
So you lose heavily on those.

 

[GK .Dundas]

And.the.Griffon.only resembles a UH 1Y

 

[GR66]

My take-away from 184 pages of discussion on this topic is that there are simply too many issues with the current Canadian Army for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) to be any sort of truly transformative restructuring of the Army.

We have an Armoured Corps with a worn out fleet of tanks that is too small to support and sustain a true Heavy Brigade and a primary Recce vehicle that current operations in Ukraine are showing may be totally unsuitable for a peer conflict.

Our Infantry Corps is undermanned to fill the 9 x Battalions we have and both the Mechanized and Light Battalions are missing the key enablers which would allow them to survive in a peer conflict (ATGMs, integral DFS, sufficient integral IDF, a SHORAD capability, etc.).

The Artillery Regiments are woefully lacking in the number of guns they have in addition to not having a self-propelled platform to at least give them a greater chance of survival in a peer conflict. We have no IDF support beyond the direct support Regiments for the Battalions, no rocket artillery, no loitering munitions, no SHORAD batteries, and no MRAD batteries or C-RAM capabilities to protect our forces or our logistics infrastructure.

Logistics support appears to be ad hoc for overseas deployments with the line between expeditionary support capabilities and garrison support capabilities in the Service Battalions being blurred. Overall our logistics support infrastructure may turn out to be very vulnerable in a large scale peer/near-peer conflict. It sound like even peacetime maintenance capabilities are stretched to almost the breaking point.

Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.

The global security situation has changed significantly since Force 2025 was first initiated and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from what is happening in Ukraine. These changes will mean that the Canadian Army has to really take a serious look at what a modern battlefield will really look like from a Canadian perspective and look at what capabilities are missing and if our Doctrine may have to be reviewed/revised in order to be successful and relevant.

Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions. Then a focus can be put on re-establishing those support capabilities that we already know are missing in order to make the infantry survivable in a peer conflict (including integral AT, AA and IDF capabilities). At the same time the Armoured Corps can focus on reviewing our Recce doctrine and determining what the Brigade Recce Squadron needs to look like and at the same time concentrating our tanks in a single Regiment. The Artillery can focus on bringing in a self-propelled gun system to replace the M777. The Combat Engineer Regiments and Service Battalions can take the time to review their own units and ensure that they have the equipment and capabilities required to support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group.

While this consolidation and re-building effort is taking place within the Army the CAF leadership should engage with the Government of Canada to push for a new Defence White Paper to clearly define what kind of forces the Government expects to be able to deploy in this new security environment. This will then allow the Army to look at the larger questions of how many and what type of Brigades are required for the Reg Force and what expectations there are for the contributions will be required from the Reserves to meet our military commitments. This would define our broader organizational and equipment/training/support requirements.

Not nearly as sexy as the other proposals, but I'm guessing that it would provide a much more solid base to build on going forward.

 

[McG]

Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions.

That was the plan before Putin started his war. Also, there needs to be PY investment in CSS and signals in addition to growing schools, increasing authorized BTL establishment, and growing remaining battalions. I don’t think that supporter investment was planned.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Griffon isn’t a AH-1Z nor a UH-60
So you lose heavily on those.

Fine. Agreed. Understood. You detest the Griffon.

So don't send them into areas where you feel the risk is too high. Reserve them for lower risk areas or augment the fleet with a number of additional aircraft that can manage the risk better. Just like it is necessary to decide whether or not to employ MRZRs, ISVs, Strykers or Bradleys ... or Blackhawks.

But even the lowly Griffon and the LAV have utility in specific circumstances. Just like the MEU(SOC) has utility in specific circumstances. And sometimes it is an XVIII Corps job and sometimes it is a III Corps job.

The advantage of a Canadianized MEU(SOC) organization is that it is a Combined Arms Battle Group that we could field right now with our existing kit, and train to as a Combined Arms standard and deploy - either in slow time by sea or by dribbling it in by air over a week or so.

And given the number of tanks we have on hand - we could generate 5 MEU(SOC)-Cda Battle Groups, each with a platoon of 4x Leo2A4M(Can) and still leave a Type 57 regiment of Leo2A4s and Leo2A6M(Can), complete with an Armoured Engr Sqn around which to create another Battle Gp or Bde Gp.

 

[dapaterson]

That was the plan before Putin started his war. Also, there needs to be PY investment in CSS and signals in addition to growing schools, increasing authorized BTL establishment, and growing remaining battalions. I don’t think that supporter investment was planned.

With CAF establishments being a zero sum game of 71.5+30, there need to be hard choices and decisions, not only about what capabilities are inside vs which are sourced from allies, but also about what must be full time, what can be part-time, and where the balance between the two lies.

The continuous refusal to admit that PY limits are a planning factor, or that budgets needs to be considered when looking at capital project options are strong contributors to how the Army has reached its current condition.