Author Topic: Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors  (Read 335361 times)

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Offline Retired AF Guy

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LCol Analyst: $100K.  Civ Equivalent:  $85K.  Plus pensionable at 25 years.  Plus health care (not provided by the province).  Plus uniforms.  Plus training.  Plus cost moves.

The full departmental cost of a military member is significantly higher than that of an equivalent civilian.


The choice of mil vs civ is not purely financial (nor should it be), but there must be a recognition of the additional costs the choice of military incurs.

I worked in DG Int back in the '80's and we had lots of civil analysts working with us and my impression was that they were making more than their military equivalent.  Also, we had several civilian analysts who were ex-military some of whom would be collecting their military pension (Major/LCol), plus, getting their civilian pay check, plus, when they retire from their civilian job they get another pension! As for uniforms I'm willing to bet that the civilian analysts got a clothing allowance or were able to claim their suits as a tax deduction. The civilian analysts went on courses, sometimes the same courses military types took, plus, relevant public service courses they had to take for promotion. I'm also willing to bet that the public service types also get help when they have to move from one city to another.

Again, some of this was just my impressions, possibly wrong, but I'm willing to bet that once you start adding up all the little perks there isn't that much of difference (cost wise) between a LCol and his/her civilian equivalent. 

Years ago, fairy tales all began with, "Once upon a time." Now we know they all began with, "If I'm elected."

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Offline TimBit

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Quote
I worked in DG Int back in the '80's and we had lots of civil analysts working with us and my impression was that they were making more than their military equivalent.  Also, we had several civilian analysts who were ex-military some of whom would be collecting their military pension (Major/LCol), plus, getting their civilian pay check, plus, when they retire from their civilian job they get another pension! As for uniforms I'm willing to bet that the civilian analysts got a clothing allowance or were able to claim their suits as a tax deduction. The civilian analysts went on courses, sometimes the same courses military types took, plus, relevant public service courses they had to take for promotion. I'm also willing to bet that the public service types also get help when they have to move from one city to another.

Again, some of this was just my impressions, possibly wrong, but I'm willing to bet that once you start adding up all the little perks there isn't that much of difference (cost wise) between a LCol and his/her civilian equivalent. 


Nowadays, since SCONDVA in the 90`s, military personel make 8% more for the same task. There certainly isn`t any clothes allowance for civvies, nor tax deductions. The one big thing you get as a civvy is, I`ll give it to you, overtime. On the downside, there`s no such thing as sliders.

You are right, PS do get moving allowance...the point was more that because they don`t typically move, civilians are less expensive to employ in a given job than a posted in military personel.

Now back on topic, before the mods slam us, I do believe, personaly, that a lot of it has to do with rank inflation for authority/prestige reasons, i.e. no one will listen to him if he`s a major so we`d better make this position LCol, therefore the director has to be a Col and the DG a Bgen. And so on. The other thing that is astonishing when one dwells at 101 is the number of people who essentially do the same job but with a different focus, i.e. south america ops versus south america policy versus south america plans. Different jobs, but still pretty similar. Obviously that does create inflationary pressures as well...other than that, I don't know that reducing the number of GOFOs really would save money or make us more efficient. I remain to be convinced.

Online E.R. Campbell

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I was told, many, many years ago and by someone who was "in the room," back in the 1960s, that the decision to (incorrectly) equate the first (director) executive level of the public service to Captain (N)/Colonel was taken as part of a huge and complex process of equating military salaries to public service benchmarks. One of the problem was to try to keep a steady progression for military ranks with the proviso that, just as one example, CPO1/WO1 (as they still were back then) be roughly equal (with trade pay) to LCdr/Maj (even, in a very few cases) to Cdr/LCol and that Lt(N)/Capt be the journeyman/working rank for most officers. Almost everything failed, except that we did get a series of major, important, earned and otherwise politically impossible pay raises and the revised system was sensible until the public service executive compensation system was changed (mid 1970s? (I can't remember any more.)) and pay for Capts (N)/Cols got buggered up beyond all recognition. But one of the unintended and deleterious consequences was rank inflation. The military's proposal, circa 1963, was for a somewhat honourary four star CDS but, for the rest, a system in which the executive level's 'base of the pyramid' started at Cdr/LCol and topped out at three three stars for a force of nearly 150,000 regulars. The decisions that were taken were based on a reasonable "take home pay" scheme - something we, then serving members, desperately needed - not on appropriate rank (and pay) for function. Following the military's (1963) plan would have resulted in a smaller, leaner but actually more expensive officer corps.
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Offline pbi

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The reduction in the number of headquarters or the consolidation of a couple of the commands would be more palatable politically than base closures.   Reducing top heavy HQ`s may not put the correct pyramid structure back into the field as these tend to be diamond shaped.

While I am very much against a willy-nilly cutting of HQs (think of a human body trying to think or act without a an adequate brain or nervous system...), I do think some economies could be made.  I am very much a fan of the "command-driven" approach that Gen Hillier introduced, I think we went a bit overboard for a Force as small as ours is.  I would:

a) Merge CEFCOM and CANADACOM into "CANOPCOM", with one Comd but a DComd Expeditionary and a DComd Continental (specifically NOT COS but "DComd");

b) Merge Support Command into: 1) the J4 branches of the OPCOM; and 2) a "Corps Troops"-type organization that answers to OPCOM, possibly under a "DComd Sp";

c) Leave CANSOFCOM alone to continue to mature and improve its capabilities: I think we will need them in the future much more than we might guess now;

d) Leave the ECS (CMS, CLS, CAS) to get on with force generation and retention which is their raison d'etre; and

e) Leave Pers Command undisturbed to continue struggling with what will prove to be, I think, very serious "J1" issues in the post-Afgh period.

Cheers
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Offline Infanteer

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How about the other 13 L1s?
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline MCG

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While I am very much against a willy-nilly cutting of HQs (think of a human body trying to think or act without a an adequate brain or nervous system...), I do think some economies could be made.  I am very much a fan of the "command-driven" approach that Gen Hillier introduced, I think we went a bit overboard for a Force as small as ours is.  I would:

a) Merge CEFCOM and CANADACOM into "CANOPCOM", with one Comd but a DComd Expeditionary and a DComd Continental (specifically NOT COS but "DComd");

b) Merge Support Command into: 1) the J4 branches of the OPCOM; and 2) a "Corps Troops"-type organization that answers to OPCOM, possibly under a "DComd Sp";

c) Leave CANSOFCOM alone to continue to mature and improve its capabilities: I think we will need them in the future much more than we might guess now;

d) Leave the ECS (CMS, CLS, CAS) to get on with force generation and retention which is their raison d'etre; and

e) Leave Pers Command undisturbed to continue struggling with what will prove to be, I think, very serious "J1" issues in the post-Afgh period.
This is exactly the sort of review we should be doing across all the L1s, but it needs to be done down to at least all the L2s (and anywhere that there is a major shake-up of the L2 structure, the review needs to dip lower into the L3s).  I agree there should be no willy-nilly cutting - there should be a deliberate structural review and rationalization (which may include cutting, shuffling, re-locating or preserving various HQs, formations, commands, bases, etc).

Offline Infanteer

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http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/10/mod-org-chart/

Think we're bad, try to decipher the 30-some-odd pages outlining the British Military....
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline pbi

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How about the other 13 L1s?

I'm not familiar with all of these, but I guess you're referring to things like ADM (IE), CDI, etc?

I am much more skeptical of them, but I have to confess that I really haven't had enough to do with any of them to form much of an opinion, except possibly CDI on the training side. In their specific case, I agree that we need a "Joint" Int handling, analysis and management agency at the L1, but I"m not at all sure they should have fingers in training and Force Generation (which is where I've dealt with them).

Cheers
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Offline Hamish Seggie

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"e) Leave Pers Command undisturbed to continue struggling with what will prove to be, I think, very serious "J1" issues in the post-Afgh period."

And these issues in the post Afghan period will be serious.
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Offline safetysOff

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Could having such an inflated general’s rank be a result of a strategy to keep the up and coming officer corp motivated? If you’re in an officer trade that maxes out at major or colonel you’d probably start f*@%ing the dog pretty hard once you get to that top rank. 
If having a higher chance to reach general is what it takes to a) keep the officer corp motivated throughout their career to perform at 100% and b) ensure an officer stays with the military their entire career than why not have 100+ generals?


What’s that ole saying, something along the lines of ‘Giving out ranks and medals is easy but finding a good man that can get a job done isn’t.’ 


Offline ArmyDoc

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Could having such an inflated general’s rank be a result of a strategy to keep the up and coming officer corp motivated? If you’re in an officer trade that maxes out at major or colonel you’d probably start f*@%ing the dog pretty hard once you get to that top rank. 
If having a higher chance to reach general is what it takes to a) keep the officer corp motivated throughout their career to perform at 100% and b) ensure an officer stays with the military their entire career than why not have 100+ generals?
While this may be a motivating factor for some (e.g. the "careerists"), it is unlikely to motivate the majority of the officer corps.  Many of those wishing to attain GOFO status see the rank as a tool to effect change at the systemic level.  For example, in my trade the pay differential in going from Col to BGen is about 5%, and for many the headaches at that rank outweigh the increased pay, perceived status, etc. 

The other reason to have GOFO's is to be able to sit at the NATO table as equals with our partners.  I know that this has been discussed before with Israel as an outlier, but typically, 1 stars talk to 1 stars, 2 stars to 2 stars, etc.  If you're a 4 ringer and your NATO counterpart is a 1 star, you're likely to be meeting with their deputy.

Offline ArmyRick

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SafetyOff,

I apprciate that your thinking about officers dogging it if they max out a certain rank level but realistically I will say this about our (CF) officers. I beleive most of them are very proffessional (from what I have seen) and even those that have maxed out (I have seen numerous Captains hit their limit for whatever reason) usually still apply themselves very well.

Officers tend to approach things (usually) different than NCM. Dog phuckers amongst the officers are rare (at least as far as I have seen However I guess the combat arms can be a slender view of things).

I was going to say something about who tends to be the worst offenders for coasting through the careers when they reach a comfortable rank level but I realise I would be p*ssing people off. We all know there are dog phuckers out there. 

It comes down to individuals choosing to be proffessional every day they put on the uniform (integrity) and knowing when it is time for them to move on to civilian life (if your not going to give an honest effort to the service, get out IMO).

To my peers, if your still given 'er, good on ya.
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Online Blackadder1916

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I came across this study re succession planning for CF GFOs that may be of interest to this discusion.  The full document is downloadble at http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-SAS-073///MP-SAS-073-13.doc

Note the numbers (highlighted in the quoted excerpt) of GFOs that they included; it differs significantly from the numbers identified earlier in this thread.

Quote
Succession Planning for the Canadian Forces General Officer Corps

Mr. Gary Christopher, Mr. Francois Larochelle and Mr. Paul Bender
Defence Research and Development Canada – Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON, Canada
K1A 0K2

ABSTRACT
Recently, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces (CF) wanted to explore career management options to shape the future demographic profile of the General/Flag Officer (GFO) Corps and provide transparency on the policy decisions that would dictate career advancement opportunities for entering into and advancing within the GFO ranks. A number of options defining conditions for mandatory release from the Canadian Forces were defined. The Workforce Modelling and Analysis Team was tasked to evaluate the proposed options and to assess the long term impact on the demographic characteristics of the GFO population. The Modelling Team also identified and assessed other potential career management options that could be utilized to shape the future GFO Corps. A combination of statistical analysis and simulation were employed to investigate the issue. Historical human resources data were analyzed to define release rates and patterns within the CF as well as the demographic characteristics of the current Officer population of the CF. A discrete-event simulation model was then created to represent the release (resignation and retirement) and career progression processes. Population transformation to 2020 was simulated. The effectiveness of the proposed career management options in shaping the GFO Corps was assessed, as well as the resultant demographic characteristics.

1.0   INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 2008, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces (CF) wanted to explore career management options to shape the future demographic profile of the General/Flag Officer (GFO) Corps and provide transparency on the policy decisions that would dictate career advancement opportunities for entering into and advancing within the GFO ranks. A number of options defining conditions for mandatory release from the Canadian Forces were defined to provide a means to ensure continual renewal of the CF leadership cadre. Subsequently, the Workforce Modelling and Analysis Team, within the Directorate of Strategic Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DSMPRA), was tasked to evaluate the proposed options and assess the long-term impact of the proposed career management options on the demographic characteristics of the General/Flag Officer population. The Modelling Team was also asked to identify and assess any other potential career management options that could be utilized to shape the future GFO Corps.

1.0 AIM AND OBJECTIVES
The overall aim of this examination of possible career management policies governing mandatory releases from the CF for senior military Officers was to identify the preferred option that would ensure the sustainability of the GFO Corps while retaining or producing the desired characteristics for the group in terms of age and experience. The selected option would then be established and utilized to develop policy, thereby providing a clear understanding of the conditions that would be used to manage senior Officer careers.

The objectives for the analysis effort undertaken by the Modelling and Analysis Team were to identify the long-term effects the different career management options would have on the sustainability of the GFO Corps and the changes that would result in the demographic profile of the GFO population. Moreover, the analysis would attempt to develop an understanding of which aspect(s) of the options was the driving force(s) shaping the resultant evolution of GFO demographic characteristics. In addition, the study would attempt to identify additional career management options that would be effective in establishing age and experience characteristics of the GFO Corps.

2.0 STUDY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In defining the scope of the study, several constraints were identified:
• Effects of the proposed career management options were to be forecast out to Fiscal Year 2020/2021 (FY 20/21).
• The current conditions/criteria for mandatory release from the CF for Officers below the GFO rank were to remain in effect:
• For the Lieutenant Colonel/LCol (Navy Commander/Cdr) rank and below, military service would be terminated when the individual reached the Compulsory Retirement Age of 60 years (CRA 60), and
• For the Colonel/Col (Captain Navy/Capt(N)) rank, military service would end when the individual reached 35 years of service or 55 years of age, whichever occurred last.
Planned increases in Col/Capt(N) and GFO positions were to be included in the study:
• Col/Capt(N) positions would grow from 291 to 300 in FY 09/10 and then remain constant for the duration, and
• GFO numbers would rise from 74 to 77 in FY 09/10 (45 1-star, 22 2-star, 9 3-star and 1 4-star), then to 80 in FY 10/11 (47 1-star, 22 2-star, 10 3-star and 1 4-star) and would remain constant at 80 thereafter.
• Col/Capt(N) must have at least two years of service (YOS) remaining before mandatory release to be eligible for promotion to the rank of Brigadier General (BGen) or Commodore (Cmdre).

« Last Edit: October 31, 2010, 17:59:31 by Blackadder1916 »
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Offline Journeyman

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I came across this study.....
Yes, but reading through it all, the bottom line is:

"Overall there is very little difference in the effects produced by the three GFO career management options that focus entirely on mandatory release criteria" [which was their main variable]. The reason being, each model included the caveat "on a case-by-case basis" -- which is to say, if your superiors want you, they'll offer another leaf.


Now, what's interesting is that the study was published as NATO document.
What does NATO have to do with our command structure? Is NATO studying the Canadian system as a way to get additional GO/FO into other countries' militaries?
~shrug~

Offline Lex Parsimoniae

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Yes, but reading through it all, the bottom line is:

"Overall there is very little difference in the effects produced by the three GFO career management options that focus entirely on mandatory release criteria" [which was their main variable]. The reason being, each model included the caveat "on a case-by-case basis" -- which is to say, if your superiors want you, they'll offer another leaf.
That's not how I read it - I thought it was release that was being decided on a case by case basis not promotion.  The table on pg 5 shows that there are no GFO older than 57 so it apparently doesn't happen often.

I thought it was interesting that "it has been shown that the majority of the GFO (and Col) Officers take their release prior to reaching 30 YOS and 55 YOA."  I didn't think there were many who made it to GFO before 30 never mind making it and retiring by 30 years.

Now, what's interesting is that the study was published as NATO document.
It was published at the NATO Research and Technology Organisation site (which apparently promotes and conducts co-operative scientific research and exchange of technical information amongst 28 NATO nations and 38 NATO partners) so perhaps it is the equivalent of a conference paper?  Or made available for peer review?

What does NATO have to do with our command structure? Is NATO studying the Canadian system as a way to get additional GO/FO into other countries' militaries?
~shrug~
Are 77-80 GFO for a nearly 70k regular force significantly more than other NATO countries?  I would also be curious how our ratios of senior NCO (CWO/MWO/WO) stack up when compared to other NATO militaries - anybody know?

Offline MCG

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I suspect it's a Radio Chatter topic anyway.   ;)

RMC has a BGen/Cmdre to oversee less than 900 OCdts. Why? Because the US service academies have a BGen, and it wouldn't be proper for Canada to be represented by a mere LCol at the RMC/West Point Hockey game.

Even better, CFC has a one-star to shepherd 120'ish Maj/LCols each year. Why? Because it would be rude to have senior guest speakers be greeted by a mere Col.

And then there's the NDHQ BGen overseeing the "Directorate of Dawdling with a MCpl in-theatre".......  >:D
Make that 140+ Cdr/LCol and LCdr/Maj  (and RCMP/civilian equivalents) on the Joint Command and Staff Programme.  There are also 40ish Capt(N)/Col (and civilian equivalents) on the 10 month National Security Programme. 

If you consider the traditional rank pyramid to still be worth retaining - then what rank would you have supervising the 40ish Capt(N)/Col students not to mention the 2 Capt(N)/Col on staff (who supervise the 25+ Cdr/LCol staff)?
Between the 13 ROTP Sqns + Otter Sqn we have between 950-1050. Sure we could bump Cmdre Truelove to Cdr, but them you'd have to bump DCdts down to Maj, all the division commanders down to Capt, and demote all the Squad bosses to Lt/SLt. You could even completely get rid of the Sqn Comds, and leave the OCdts in charge. The AMS head would need to drop down from Col, as we can't have him higher ranked than the Cmdt. Why stop there? CDA Comd no longer needs to be that of a GOFO does it? It's just a downward spiral from there.

The point here is that the Commandant does more than just babysit the Cadet Wing.

... The Cmdt has under him the Cadet Wing under the Cadet Wing Commander, the Mil Wing under the DCdts and the Academic Wing under the Principal. Fine, discount the Cadet Wing, but you still have hundreds of profs and associated staff in the Academic Wing (some military, holding rank from Capt to Col) and the Mil Wing, that while smaller in number, still has a LCol, several Maj/LCdr and a plethora of Capts. To drop the Cmdt's rank, you would have to axe too many positions below.
If CFC were moved to Kingston with RMC, could a single BGen look after the combined entity?  Would the broader responsibility justify the rank in the eyes of those who currently question it?

... I'd be more interested in turning the critical eye on is the large clag of LCol/Cols and CWO types that are essentially "civilians in uniform" doing something that a Captain or a Sergeant could do.  While staff bloat may create a Brigadier General or two, it has created loads of this latter type.
I would also include, in that review, a scan of Majors doing the job of a Capt and captains doing the job of a Lt.  An aggravating factor (and one which can be well seen in Army brigades) is the automatic percolation of Lieutenants into Captains without any quality filter and weak experience filters.  Staff cells which historically functioned under the guidance of a Capt are now staffed full of captains and there is the perceived need to throw a major into the mix to lead all those captains.

It used to be that the brigade HQ "G-men" were captains, less the G3 & G4 who (as majors) also acted as overseers for the broader ops and sp functions.  Now we want all the "G-men" to be majors, and we have invented LCol positions as DCOSs to do the two overseer role. 

Lt should be the working rank of staff in a tactical level HQ - units and brigades in the Army.  In a Regt, the only captains in the HQ should be Ops O & Adjt.

At the operational and strategic levels of HQ, the working rank of Capt is more palatable.  Despite that, I have no doubt there are places for Lts in these HQs (potentially more so in certain occupations) and suspect there are places within these levels where automatic percolation to Capt is causing rank inflation pressures.  There is potentially indirect bottom-up pressures as the system attempts to provide room for career advancement of captains who reached that rank ahead of their time.

It has been proposed previously (many times & in many places), but I suspect that merit based promotions to Capt (and the replacement of all Lt/Capt positions with hard Lt positions) would reduce rank inflation through intermediate levels.

How about the other 13 L1s?
I would like to see two tiers of L1.  The 1As are the "mission elements" - our reason for existing: the ECSs and a CANOPSCOM (hell, let's through in the policy group on the notion that the military is a tool of influence for international politics).  The rest would be 1Bs - which exist to support our "mission elements."  L1As get two votes each in any gathering of L1s and may be commanded by up to a LGen (or EX equivalent).  L1Bs get one vote each and may be commanded/managed by up to a MGen (or EX equivalent).

... in the process, some L1s might (maybe) be merged or exported to other government departments.


Offline Infanteer

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.I would also include, in that review, a scan of Majors doing the job of a Capt and captains doing the job of a Lt.  An aggravating factor (and one which can be well seen in Army brigades) is the automatic percolation of Lieutenants into Captains without any quality filter and weak experience filters.  Staff cells which historically functioned under the guidance of a Capt are now staffed full of captains and there is the perceived need to throw a major into the mix to lead all those captains.

It used to be that the brigade HQ "G-men" were captains, less the G3 & G4 who (as majors) also acted as overseers for the broader ops and sp functions.  Now we want all the "G-men" to be majors, and we have invented LCol positions as DCOSs to do the two overseer role. 

Lt should be the working rank of staff in a tactical level HQ - units and brigades in the Army.  In a Regt, the only captains in the HQ should be Ops O & Adjt.

At the operational and strategic levels of HQ, the working rank of Capt is more palatable.  Despite that, I have no doubt there are places for Lts in these HQs (potentially more so in certain occupations) and suspect there are places within these levels where automatic percolation to Capt is causing rank inflation pressures.  There is potentially indirect bottom-up pressures as the system attempts to provide room for career advancement of captains who reached that rank ahead of their time.

It has been proposed previously (many times & in many places), but I suspect that merit based promotions to Capt (and the replacement of all Lt/Capt positions with hard Lt positions) would reduce rank inflation through intermediate levels.

Interesting point, and one that I've seen pointed at before - Storr's "Command of British Forces in Iraq" highlights the problems of overinflated staffs and how they can slow things down.  We are now seeing Infantry battalions employing Majors as Bn Ops Os (which they are allowed to do as the Position Lists state so).  I have no doubt that the merging of the Lieutenant and Captain rank into a single rank has created pressure from below on the rank system.

Creating a realistic divide between Captains and Lieutenants is important and demands a few things:

1.  We change our commissioning plans that accelerate officers under certain plans (DEO) making them eligible for promotion to Captain within their first year of leaving the school house;

2.  As already mentioned, we need to make the rank of Captain a merited one; and

3.  We change our way of "managing" the rank - CMP views the rank as "Lt-Capt" for all planning purposes (PML, TES, SIP, PSR, etc) yet a Lieutenant in is not a Captain out.  Result is that we see "The Infantry is short 80 Lt-Capt", so the solution - based off faulty measurement - is to simply jam 80 more Lieutenants from the schools into the Battalions.  First off, that doesn't solve the problem as Battalions are not short subbies and second you can't take a Lieutenant and make him a Brigade Plans Officer, although that metric of "Lt-Capt" seems to say so.

Quote
I would like to see two tiers of L1.  The 1As are the "mission elements" - our reason for existing: the ECSs and a CANOPSCOM (hell, let's through in the policy group on the notion that the military is a tool of influence for international politics).  The rest would be 1Bs - which exist to support our "mission elements."  L1As get two votes each in any gathering of L1s and may be commanded by up to a LGen (or EX equivalent).  L1Bs get one vote each and may be commanded/managed by up to a MGen (or EX equivalent).

... in the process, some L1s might (maybe) be merged or exported to other government departments.

A good start.  Looking at the L1s, I could probably do away with a bunch of them quite easily with merging or exporting.
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I would like to see two tiers of L1.  The 1As are the "mission elements" - our reason for existing: the ECSs and a CANOPSCOM (hell, let's through in the policy group on the notion that the military is a tool of influence for international politics).  The rest would be 1Bs - which exist to support our "mission elements."  L1As get two votes each in any gathering of L1s and may be commanded by up to a LGen (or EX equivalent).  L1Bs get one vote each and may be commanded/managed by up to a MGen (or EX equivalent).

... in the process, some L1s might (maybe) be merged or exported to other government departments.


I would go farther:

1. NDHQ = MND + DM plus a great many L1s, some of which have military personelled in them and a very few of which might actually be led by a military officer; and, subordinate to NDHQ

2. CFHQ = CDS plus his (or her) mission elements from L1 all the way down to rifle section and so on. There would be some civilians in senior positions, but not in command positions, here, in the CF.

The DM's NDHQ is wholly and completely responsible for strategy, policy, budgeting and material and so on. the CDS' CFHQ is responsible for executing the missions assigned to the CF by the government of the day and for developing and validating its requirements for people, training, equipment, facilities and so on.

This is not a proposal for two separate and distinct HQs - my CFHQ would exist as a subordinate part of NDHQ, allowing the MND and DM to direct the CDS on mattrers of strategy, policy, etc, etc while still allowing the CDS unfettered access to the MND and PM on operational matters.
 
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Offline N. McKay

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This is not a proposal for two separate and distinct HQs - my CFHQ would exist as a subordinate part of NDHQ, allowing the MND and DM to direct the CDS on mattrers of strategy, policy, etc, etc while still allowing the CDS unfettered access to the MND and PM on operational matters.

That would be a significant change for the CDS in that he is now a peer to the Deputy Minister.

Offline Jarnhamar

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Correct me if I am wrong but when I look at the various courses being run it seems like there is way more basic officer courses being run than junior leadership courses.
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Correct me if I am wrong but when I look at the various courses being run it seems like there is way more basic officer courses being run than junior leadership courses.

BMOQ is centralized and run only out of CFLRS.  CFPLQ (and it's variants) are run decentrally by the three environments.  So, it appears that there are more BMOQ being run when, in fact, there are many more (CF) PLQ serials being run across all the environments.
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That would be a significant change for the CDS in that he is now a peer to the Deputy Minister.


That is correct, but, the CDS has a very, very limited to near zero role in DND (the department of government), per se. DND consists of all the DM's L1s, some of which would still be there even if we disbanded the CF. Thus, the DM runs the Department and one (major) element of that big department is the CF, which the CDS runs. It makes sense to me that the DM should run DND from NDHQ and the CDS should run the CF from CFHQ. But maybe I'm just old and simple.
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The NDA is very clear that the MND is responsible for DND and the CF, which are separate entities.

Offline armybuck041

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Creating a realistic divide between Captains and Lieutenants is important and demands a few things:

1.  We change our commissioning plans that accelerate officers under certain plans (DEO) making them eligible for promotion to Captain within their first year of leaving the school house;

2.  As already mentioned, we need to make the rank of Captain a merited one; and

3.  We change our way of "managing" the rank - CMP views the rank as "Lt-Capt" for all planning purposes (PML, TES, SIP, PSR, etc) yet a Lieutenant in is not a Captain out.  Result is that we see "The Infantry is short 80 Lt-Capt", so the solution - based off faulty measurement - is to simply jam 80 more Lieutenants from the schools into the Battalions.  First off, that doesn't solve the problem as Battalions are not short subbies and second you can't take a Lieutenant and make him a Brigade Plans Officer, although that metric of "Lt-Capt" seems to say so.

I couldn't agree more....  This is a policy that deserves as much scrutiny as the whole GOFO issue. Nearly worthy of a Topic Split :)

Minor sidetrack: In the current (broken) context, I find it odd that policy states that a CFR Lt does not enter promotion zone within the same timelines as a ROTP/DEO Lt (3 years versus 2, or even 1 year in some cases). Pay is better for a CFR, but with an Officer Advancement system that is clearly geared towards age/rank milestones, why someone who is most likely much older with double digit years of experience > than his/her ROTP/DEO peers is dealt an additional year as an Lt is a bit frustrating..... I digress.... 
« Last Edit: November 08, 2010, 21:20:21 by armybuck041 »
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Offline N. McKay

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It makes sense to me that the DM should run DND from NDHQ and the CDS should run the CF from CFHQ.

That makes good sense, but I would suggest that NDHQ and CFHQ should be parallel to one another, rather than one being subordinate to the other.  A structure in which the civilian bureaucracy is run by the Deputy and the forces themselves by the CDS, each of whom reports to the Minister, would be more conventional.