Author Topic: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy  (Read 861417 times)

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Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2750 on: June 23, 2019, 14:14:33 »
Our shipbuilding mess continues, CCGS Hudson section:

Quote
Lead paint to delay refit of Canada’s oldest coast guard vessel by 6 months

A $10-million refit of Canada’s oldest coast guard vessel will be delayed by up to six months to remove lead paint found inside the ocean science ship Hudson.
-Advertisement-

Repair work on the storied 56-year old ship was expected to last until this fall at the NewDock shipyard in St. John’s.

But NewDock told the coast guard this week that safely dealing with lead paint discovered inside CCGS Hudson will delay the refit.

“Six months is the worst-case scenario that we have from the shipyard,” said Gary Ivany, the coast guard’s assistant commissioner, in an interview from Ottawa.

Hudson arrived at NewDock in February and was taken out of the water to replace steel and various areas of the vessel’s decks and tanks.

How the lead paint was found

The coast guard is trying to keep the ship at sea until 2024, which is when a replacement is scheduled to be in service [emphasis added, see below].

In late April, suspected lead paint buried under newer paint layers was discovered when coatings were removed.

Sixteen unionized coast guard crew and officers were given blood tests after it was confirmed the paint contained lead.

The test results are pending.

Shipyard workers and their family doctors were also informed, the coast guard said.

Area sealed off

The area was sealed off and work has yet to resume in those spaces, but work continues in areas that have been cleared and identified as safe for workers, such as the bridge deck, boat deck, engine room and motor room.

The Public Service Alliance of Canada, which is the union representing 10 coast guard crewmen, says the paint was detected in a water tank inside the ship and workers will not go back until they know the area is safe.

In the meantime, the coast guard wants to move up work that was planned for after the refit and carry it out while the ship is still out of the water in St. John’s.

That work, which includes engine maintenance and installing science equipment like winches, was supposed to take place dockside when the Hudson returned to her home base in Dartmouth, N.S., in the fall.

The coast guard still intends to have the Hudson back in service by April 2020 [emphasis added] and available for at-sea science missions.

Ivany said Public Services and Procurement Canada will tell the coast guard in the coming weeks what this means for the project’s budget.

The NewDock contract was for $10 million, while a contract for alongside work planned for Dartmouth has not been awarded.

“Extending the ship there longer will have an impact on cost, but we’re hoping that it’s well within the contingencies of the work they were planning to do,” said Ivany.

The refit at NewDock is Phase 2 of a life extension for CCGS Hudson.

Troubled repair history

Phase 1 was carried out in 2017 by Heddle Marine in Hamilton.

The $4-million refit was five months behind schedule and still unfinished when the government towed the Hudson out of the shipyard rather than risk having it trapped for months by the winter closure of the St. Lawrence Seaway.

The delay forced DFO to spend $2.5 million chartering vessels to carry out science missions on the East Coast of Canada because Hudson was unavailable.

The ship has a storied past. In 1970, it became the first ship to sail around North and South America.
Hudson was supposed to be replaced 5 years ago

Hudson was supposed to be replaced 5 years ago

The Hudson was supposed to be replaced as early as 2014 as part of the national shipbuilding strategy, but the project to build a new offshore oceanographic science vessel at Vancouver’s Seaspan shipyard is behind schedule as the yard works on two navy supply ships.

Earlier this year, Global News reported that the Davie Shipyard in Quebec told the federal government it would not bid on the latest life extension refit job, saying the Hudson was beyond repair [emphasis added].
http://easternontarionetwork.com/2019/06/22/lead-paint-to-delay-refit-of-canadas-oldest-coast-guard-vessel-by-6-months/

It was announced in Feb. this year that the (one only) new CCG offshore oceanographic science vessel will now be built by Seaspan after first RCN JSS, not before as had been planned:
https://www.nsnews.com/news/joint-support-ship-next-for-seaspan-shipyard-1.23627335

Now do these dates on gov't website make sense? OOSV one year after first JSS and second JSS one year after that?

Quote
...
Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel
...
Project budget:
    Under review [STILL CAN'T GIVE A FIGURE! After all the years]
Estimated delivery:
    2024
...
Joint Support Ships
...
Estimated delivery:
    JSS 1: 2023
    JSS 2: 2025
...
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/projets-projects-eng.html#s9

Bets on all those dates being met?

Mark
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Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2751 on: June 23, 2019, 18:15:20 »
JSS 1 is moving along, I suspect they have it launched by sometime in 2023, but will take more time before acceptance.

Offline Cloud Cover

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2752 on: June 24, 2019, 00:44:56 »
Good thing they aren't trying to build an aircraft carrier, you might see it in 2050.
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Offline MTShaw

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2753 on: June 24, 2019, 12:21:13 »
Good thing they aren't trying to build an aircraft carrier, you might see it in 2050.

Seaspan is building the USS Ford?

Offline Cloud Cover

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2754 on: June 24, 2019, 17:03:12 »
You’d think they were with the amount of time taken.
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Offline Oldgateboatdriver

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2755 on: June 24, 2019, 19:54:34 »
I remind you that Seaspan cannot build the JSS, or any other government vessel for that matter, without a contract being in place. Seaspan has actually managed to get permission from said government to begin pre-building some of the sections of JSS 1 before the contract is actually let out. That is amazing in itself and will save time down the line - but I blame the government for not having managed to negotiate the contract for JSS 1 yet - after all these years and so long after selecting the winning design.

I don't blame Seaspan at all for delays in this matter.

Offline Uzlu

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2756 on: June 24, 2019, 20:29:56 »
I remind you that Seaspan cannot build the JSS, or any other government vessel for that matter, without a contract being in place. Seaspan has actually managed to get permission from said government to begin pre-building some of the sections of JSS 1 before the contract is actually let out. That is amazing in itself and will save time down the line - but I blame the government for not having managed to negotiate the contract for JSS 1 yet - after all these years and so long after selecting the winning design.

I don't blame Seaspan at all for delays in this matter.
Quote
On completion of the work, a vessel design ready for full production and construction will be delivered.
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/rapport-report-2018-8-eng.html#a5

No contract, because the design is not ready.

Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2757 on: June 24, 2019, 20:58:23 »
Interesting, PWGC shows the Polar Icebreaker to be built at Seaspan, but Seaspan has wiped their webpage of it.

Offline Uzlu

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2758 on: June 27, 2019, 08:11:38 »
Quote
Seaspan a hive of shipbuilding activity on heels of first delivery to Canadian Coast Guard

After growing pains, the North Vancouver shipyard has been buoyed by the award of 16 new vessels under the National Shipbuilding Program.

Seaspan Shipyards will deliver its first ship under the multibillion-dollar National Shipbuilding Program to the Canadian Coast Guard on June 27, two years behind its initial schedule after production problems and the growing pains of rebuilding an industry.

“We haven’t arrived at this alone,” Seaspan CEO Mark Lamarre was careful to point out, talking about the growing pains that the yard has had ramping up a rebuild of the West Coast’s shipbuilding industry in just a few years.

Lamarre argued that the federal government has had to relearn just as much about how to specify what it wants in new ships and order them as Seaspan has had to about building them and it is all “a work in progress.”

“(However) I couldn’t be more pleased with what we’ve demonstrated with the (following) ships,” Lamarre said.

As Seaspan hands over the first vessel, the 64-metre CCGS Sir John Franklin in Victoria, there is no rest at the company’s North Vancouver shipyard. There, some 1,200 shipfitters, welders, machinists and other trades are busily assembling modules of the third coast guard ship being built under the contract (the second, another fisheries research vessel, was launched June 5 to undergo completion work and sea trials).

And they’re now deep into building components for the fourth ship, the first of two joint-support vessels for the Royal Canadian Navy, the construction of which was accelerated under the program.

In 2011, Seaspan won what was then an $8-billion contract to build ships for the coast guard and non-combatant supply vessels for the Navy under the program.

A bigger contract to build combat vessels for the Navy went to Irving Shipbuilding in Nova Scotia.

However, budgets for the program have ballooned and timelines extended, which Lamarre, a third-generation shipbuilder with 35-years’ experience in the industry, said isn’t unexpected.

“Original schedules and budgets are almost all the time wrong and optimistic,” Lamarre said, when a government embarks on an ambitious plan to commission new naval and coast guard ships after decades of inactivity in the sector. Critics have questioned why Canada would spend increasing amounts of tax dollars to rejuvenate domestic shipbuilding when they could save money by buying ships virtually off-the-shelf from allies overseas.

In 2017, for instance, an Italian-French consortium offered an unsolicited bid to build 15 new naval frigates for Canada at a fixed cost of $30 billion, versus a now-anticipated $60 billion cost for the program in Canada. Lamarre, however, argued that Seaspan is trying to position itself to be cost-competitive enough to enter the export market itself while building a “sovereign capability” for Canada.

The CEO is a relative newcomer to the program having arrived at Seaspan just under a year ago with a team of experienced senior managers with between 30 and 40 ship completions under their belts to shepherd the program through its next phase.

Lamarre himself has 24 years at a shipbuilding subsidiary of U.S. defence contractor General Dynamics. And he led the Australian firm ASC through a similar program.

“The similarities to Australia here are so stark,” Lamarre said. “We’re using basically the same game plan.”

Seaspan has an “enthusiastic, young, highly skilled workforce,” Lamarre said, but “you only get three-ships worth of experience after you build three ships.”

And while Seaspan is trying to set international benchmarks for ship construction, “the people who are going to get there the fastest are the people who have seen 30 to 40 ships.”

Economically speaking, besides the thousand or so jobs that the program has created, which now makes Seaspan B.C.’s biggest manufacturer, Lamarre said Canada is starting to experience a boost within the supply chain the shipyard has established to feed its operations. Steel for the Navy’s joint-support vessels now regularly rolls into North Van from Algoma Steel in Sault Ste Marie, Ont.

In total, Lamarre said Seaspan has spent $935 million with some 630 different suppliers across Canada, with $405 million staying with 472 companies in B.C.

Earlier this month, The Canadian Press reported that the federal government had removed construction of a heavy icebreaker for the coast guard, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker from Seaspan’s contract. Fisheries Minister Jonathan Wilkinson was quoted as saying that government was “exploring other options to ensure the (icebreaker) is built in the most efficient manner,” though no decisions have been made.

On Wednesday, Lamarre said Seaspan is still in discussions over the ship, but looks to another decision to award Seaspan an additional 16 multipurpose vessels for the coast guard as a vote of confidence in the program.
https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/seaspan-a-hive-of-shipbuilding-activity-on-heels-of-first-delivery-to-canadian-coast-guard

Offline Harrigan

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2759 on: June 29, 2019, 18:30:47 »
The latest lean from Liberal Operatives on Twitter is now to bring out the "circumvention of procurement process rules" as a reason why Norman was charged. This loops back to the idea from some in government that procurement rules are sacrosanct and came down from the mount etched in stone. That is complete baloney, rules and procedures are constantly in flux because nothing is perfect and an entity that is married to dogma is doomed to failure.

Also there is no bloody way in hell that Vance (nor Lawson before him) was in the dark about CRCN dealing directly with Davie (allegedly) under orders from the PM. If Ottawa is as leaky as everyone says it is (and it is!) then he would have heard about it. But the process of acquiring the iAOR would have been part of the briefing package the CDS routinely reviews.

I agree that rules nad procedures and constantly in flux, but changes to those rules must be done transparently with a clear understanding by everyone (including the public) as to why the rules are being ignored.  They are there to prevent fraud and corruption.  Clearly in this case, ignoring the rules was not done transparently, and thus there was a risk of fraud and corruption.  Should it not have been investigated by an incoming government?

Is there any proof that CDS knew about it, or was briefed on it, or just a "gut feel"?  The question I have is:  If everyone in the CF Chain of Command was well aware of it, then why would the successor government be going after Norman?  Surely if the Liberals knew that the previous government had ordered Norman to deal directly with Davie (allegedly), they would have gone after the Conservatives for circumventing procurement rules, not an Admiral.  It makes no sense at all to go after Norman if "everybody would have known" that he was under orders.

The way this played out suggests that the Liberals did not know that the Conservative government had given Norman that direction (allegedly)

Offline Harrigan

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2760 on: June 29, 2019, 18:38:56 »
I too, am fine with the PM (any PM) circumventing contracting and procurement rules. At the end of the day, he is the final arbtrar of those rules and wears the results- good or bad.

I will admit that I am surprised at these responses.  I would have thought that we would have expected our senior leaders to follow the same rules that we must operate under.  Apparently not. 

If "ends justifty the means", which is what you are saying, then I look forward to seeing the responses should the Liberal government announce that they have decided to do away with any selection process for a new fighter that would include the F-35, and just directly buy a hundred more old F-18's, or some more second-hand jets from somewhere that might benefit them politically.  :pop:

Online SeaKingTacco

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2761 on: June 29, 2019, 21:24:57 »
I will admit that I am surprised at these responses.  I would have thought that we would have expected our senior leaders to follow the same rules that we must operate under.  Apparently not. 

If "ends justifty the means", which is what you are saying, then I look forward to seeing the responses should the Liberal government announce that they have decided to do away with any selection process for a new fighter that would include the F-35, and just directly buy a hundred more old F-18's, or some more second-hand jets from somewhere that might benefit them politically.  :pop:

My point is: the buck ultimately stops with the PM. Much (most?) of procurement rules in Canada are not "law". They are departmental procedure. Much of it is designed to give cover for bureaucrats, so no one gets blamed.

If the Governor in Council decides Canada needs to buy something (anything really) urgently enough, somebody in PSPC is going to say...what, exactly?

Sure, there may almost certainly be a price to be paid, politically (but not always. See: sole sourcing of C17s).

I stand by my original statement- if the PM and cabinet (of any political stripe) decide something needs to be bought urgently enough, PSPC rules are now to be damned.


Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2762 on: June 29, 2019, 22:08:45 »
The "buck", under the Westminster system, should not stop with the PM but rather the Governor-in-Council, i.e. the cabinet.  But over the last forty years or so our actually-existing system has in fact become de facto presidential though without the checks and balances that, at least normally (Trump), function within the US system.

In real terms the PCO/PMO is much more powerful/effective than the White House staff in controlling the day-to-day functioning as a whole and in detail of the respective governments.

Mark
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Offline MilEME09

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2763 on: June 30, 2019, 09:23:15 »
My point is: the buck ultimately stops with the PM. Much (most?) of procurement rules in Canada are not "law". They are departmental procedure. Much of it is designed to give cover for bureaucrats, so no one gets blamed.

If the Governor in Council decides Canada needs to buy something (anything really) urgently enough, somebody in PSPC is going to say...what, exactly?

Sure, there may almost certainly be a price to be paid, politically (but not always. See: sole sourcing of C17s).

I stand by my original statement- if the PM and cabinet (of any political stripe) decide something needs to be bought urgently enough, PSPC rules are now to be damned.

I agree, look at the leopard 2 or C17 purchase, if the system wants to move quickly it can. It's protecting peoples kingdoms,and justifying jobs by dragging things out even longer then necessary. As an example a friend pointed out to me, us and the British started a project to replace our service pistols at the same time. Two years later they had new pistols, and we are apparently 10 years away from new ones.
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Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2764 on: June 30, 2019, 15:55:10 »

I stand by my original statement- if the PM and cabinet (of any political stripe) decide something needs to be bought urgently enough, PSPC rules are now to be damned.

There are actually rules for emergency procurement that basically bypasses the standard contracting process, but needs the right level of approval and circumstances. They fast tracked stuff for Afghanistan, but there is a separate procedure for an actual emergency where they can direct the contract and get work started before the details are finalized (ie the tow of ATH back in 2015 when it got stuck on a reef of Cape Breton).

All the Cons did for the Davie contract is adjust one of the exceptions to the normal rules at the Cabinet level and make it happen.  There was a huge amount of staff work that went into the background of that, but it was all according to the rules of the day.

Not really rocket surgery why they went after Norman; it was pure politics. Absolutely greasy dirty pool, and sounds like they selectively held back critical information that would have exonerated him, while the investigators put the blinders on and didn't chase threads to their obvious conclusions.

On the plus side, when it became apparent they had gotten sand bagged, the crown stayed the charges, but BS that it took years for that to come out.

Personally had a lot of respect for VAdm Norman, and he was someone that made me think that maybe it's not just koolaid. Watching him get run killed any vestige of loyalty to the institution, so just making things better for the sailors that keeps it from just being a job where you punch the clock.

Offline HB_Pencil

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2765 on: July 02, 2019, 10:53:28 »
There are actually rules for emergency procurement that basically bypasses the standard contracting process, but needs the right level of approval and circumstances. They fast tracked stuff for Afghanistan, but there is a separate procedure for an actual emergency where they can direct the contract and get work started before the details are finalized (ie the tow of ATH back in 2015 when it got stuck on a reef of Cape Breton).

All the Cons did for the Davie contract is adjust one of the exceptions to the normal rules at the Cabinet level and make it happen.  There was a huge amount of staff work that went into the background of that, but it was all according to the rules of the day.

Not really rocket surgery why they went after Norman; it was pure politics. Absolutely greasy dirty pool, and sounds like they selectively held back critical information that would have exonerated him, while the investigators put the blinders on and didn't chase threads to their obvious conclusions.

On the plus side, when it became apparent they had gotten sand bagged, the crown stayed the charges, but BS that it took years for that to come out.

Personally had a lot of respect for VAdm Norman, and he was someone that made me think that maybe it's not just koolaid. Watching him get run killed any vestige of loyalty to the institution, so just making things better for the sailors that keeps it from just being a job where you punch the clock.

Oh... the Davie Clause! Section 3.1 (G) of the GCR... Where if you need an urgent "Interim" capability, you can get something outside of the normal process.

Hmmm, urgent requirement to address a capability gap... "Interim" capability... where have I heard that before?

Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2766 on: July 02, 2019, 11:05:04 »
Oh... the Davie Clause! Section 3.1 (G) of the GCR... Where if you need an urgent "Interim" capability, you can get something outside of the normal process.

Hmmm, urgent requirement to address a capability gap... "Interim" capability... where have I heard that before?

I honestly am not really sure what you are getting at.

In context of the times, we went from two old AORs to zero very quickly when PRO had the fire and PRE was found to be rusted out and unseaworthy.

The Asterix is filling in while the JSS project is running through as part of the NSS, and only provides a portion of the full capability, so it is an interim capability.  It's a long time scale, but lets us get gas at sea while the project trickles it's way through the GoC process.  They've got the design mostly done, and are actively building portions of it, so unless we do something genius like cancel the project (and pay full ship cost for no ship) just playing the hurry up and wait game until we finally have an AOR of our own. We've already signed the ISSC for that as well, so given that we've bought the design, the steel, major systems, spare parts and a 20+ year maintenance/training plan, it's not exactly a pipe dream anymore.

Offline Good2Golf

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2767 on: July 02, 2019, 12:39:41 »
I honestly am not really sure what you are getting at.

In context of the times, we went from two old AORs to zero very quickly when PRO had the fire and PRE was found to be rusted out and unseaworthy...

^this :nod:

There is not even a fine line between:

AOR: 3 > 2 > 0 (with an extant cadre of AOR-skilled sailors to operate one or more vessels of type)

...and...

CF-188: 138 > 85 > 73 > 60-ish?  (with a shortage of pilots and techs to fully operate and sustain the current fleet)

Regards
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Offline Chief Engineer

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2768 on: July 02, 2019, 12:57:45 »
I honestly am not really sure what you are getting at.

In context of the times, we went from two old AORs to zero very quickly when PRO had the fire and PRE was found to be rusted out and unseaworthy.

The Asterix is filling in while the JSS project is running through as part of the NSS, and only provides a portion of the full capability, so it is an interim capability.  It's a long time scale, but lets us get gas at sea while the project trickles it's way through the GoC process.  They've got the design mostly done, and are actively building portions of it, so unless we do something genius like cancel the project (and pay full ship cost for no ship) just playing the hurry up and wait game until we finally have an AOR of our own. We've already signed the ISSC for that as well, so given that we've bought the design, the steel, major systems, spare parts and a 20+ year maintenance/training plan, it's not exactly a pipe dream anymore.

I always wondered in regards to the Asterix exactly what were the requirements from the RCN in the first place, we have over the top cabins, gyms, multi-configurable spaces etc that seems not in the list of requirements for the RCN or way over the requirements for an interim vessel.
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Offline Colin P

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Offline HB_Pencil

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2770 on: July 02, 2019, 13:29:34 »
I honestly am not really sure what you are getting at.

In context of the times, we went from two old AORs to zero very quickly when PRO had the fire and PRE was found to be rusted out and unseaworthy.

The Asterix is filling in while the JSS project is running through as part of the NSS, and only provides a portion of the full capability, so it is an interim capability.  It's a long time scale, but lets us get gas at sea while the project trickles it's way through the GoC process.  They've got the design mostly done, and are actively building portions of it, so unless we do something genius like cancel the project (and pay full ship cost for no ship) just playing the hurry up and wait game until we finally have an AOR of our own. We've already signed the ISSC for that as well, so given that we've bought the design, the steel, major systems, spare parts and a 20+ year maintenance/training plan, it's not exactly a pipe dream anymore.

I think you've misread what I was trying to say here Pete, I didn't have a problem with the Asterix or how it was pushed through, although the story of how it came about still has a lot of pork sausage ground in than is generally understood in the public. Rather I find it funny how the Davie Clause was the method several years later to justify the purchase of a capability that was far more damaging to the RCAF and the military as a whole, in regards to the Super Hornet.

Offline Navy_Pete

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2771 on: July 02, 2019, 16:37:23 »
Maybe I'm just a bit sleep deprived, but I'm going to need a map to get from that point A to B and the link to the Superhornet (which I thought was shelved?).  They can use the same justification for anything that fits; whether or not the outcome makes the most sense is a different issue all together.

The JSS project is something like 40 years old and this is attempt no 3, so there were a whole lot of balls dropped before now that led to the AORs self retiring. Probably a common theme amongst most equipment where we replace it well after it's due for whatever reason, and sometimes it falls apart beforehand to leave us in with a big capability gap. There was a bunch of work beforehand when the two AORs were winding down and JSS was delayed by the failed procurement then  pushed right, but then we lost both AORs three or four years earlier than planned, so it got bumped up the priority list and got pretty quick approval from Cabinet.

Offline Underway

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2772 on: July 02, 2019, 22:31:31 »
I always wondered in regards to the Asterix exactly what were the requirements from the RCN in the first place, we have over the top cabins, gyms, multi-configurable spaces etc that seems not in the list of requirements for the RCN or way over the requirements for an interim vessel.

From what I understood it was essentially a list of only a few things.  RAS capability for DFO, JP5, Heavy Jackstay (for food, frozen and fresh).  VERTREP (flight deck) might have been on that list for the added transfer capability.  Everything else were add ons that Davie did on their own.  The cabins etc... were because those are the minimum standard for merchant marine.  The navy folks were wondering how they were going to get sailors off of the ASterix because the conditions were so plush, and the civilian Capt was wondering how he was going to retain civilian crew because the conditions were so primitive (no hot tub?  blasphemy!)

Offline Colin P

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2773 on: July 03, 2019, 01:38:40 »
CCG prefers the term "Hypothermia rewarming treatment device" to Hot Tub.  8)

 

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
« Reply #2774 on: July 03, 2019, 02:09:27 »
The JSS project is something like 40 years old and this is attempt no 3, so there were a whole lot of balls dropped before now that led to the AORs self retiring.

That's a keeper  :nod:
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon