Author Topic: Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]  (Read 341188 times)

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Offline jollyjacktar

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Re: Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]
« Reply #800 on: April 30, 2018, 19:49:23 »
I've only been to 2 or 3 of those places.  Just educated guessing on my part.
Annoying Liberals, apparently I'm doing a good job of it =)

Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]
« Reply #801 on: May 03, 2018, 16:04:26 »
Russian academic on their nukes (including "escalation for de-escalation"), doctrine important for NORAD--excerpts:

Quote
Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Reality Check

In 1991-1992, the US and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral but reciprocal ‘presidential nuclear initiatives’ to reduce their respective stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). The thousands of such weapons the two countries had accumulated had become a burden for their owners. But TNWs to this day remain important for Russia’s military power, and the Kremlin’s aspiration for special status in the world. They are also intended to make up for problems with the precision and reliability of Russia’s conventional weapons.

The real Russian arsenal of TNWs is below most estimates: approximately 520 warheads, as opposed to figures ranging from 1,000-2,000. Against the backdrop of the confrontation with the West, Moscow is trying to take advantage of this discrepancy in numbers for foreign policy purposes. The key role is played by the doctrine of nuclear de-escalation, coupled with the intention to politically damage the system of America’s nuclear guarantees to its European allies. At the same time, the withdrawal of TNWs lowers the threshold for their use...

Modernisation of delivery systems

The number of Russian TNW delivery systems is also changing. In general, it is declining, due to the phasing out of old equipment. The introduction of new equipment is not keeping up with the pace of retirement of old systems.

Long-range aviation


Russia’s long-range aircraft include heavy (strategic) Tupolev Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers, which fall under the START-3 (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty, and Tu-22M3 strike bombers. There are 30-50 operational aircraft in Russia, while no more than 30 aircraft are scheduled for upgrading. Each is armed with three dual-capable Kh-22 cruise missiles (up to 600 km) and the Kh-32 upgraded version (up to 1,000 km) equipped with conventional warheads. It can also be deduced that the Tu-22M3 bombers will be upgraded with Kh-101/ Kh-102 strategic cruise missiles (range of up to 4,500 km) or their latest versions [emphasis added]. At the same time, it seems Moscow is considering the use of Kh-32 missiles on MiG-31 fighters. In other words, the Tu-22M3 can turn into a strategic bomber, and therefore fall under the START-3 Treaty and lose the status of a TNW carrier [if Tu-95MS and Tu-160 carry nuclear-armed Kh-102 cruise missiles those weapons are hardly "tactical"]...

Ships and submarines

By all accounts, the lion’s share of TNWs is intended for the Russian fleet. On paper, nearly 120 ships and submarines can carry hundreds of nuclear-armed cruise missiles, torpedoes and mines. Modernisation of these weapons systems is significant. At least four out of eight Antey (Oscar II) cruise missile submarines are being rearmed with Onyx and Kalibr missile systems, which have superseded the nuclear-capable Granit cruise missiles; this has increased the operational stock. Moreover, four out of 11 Shchuka-B (Pike-B) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are being upgraded with the Kalibr. The remaining SSNs will either be rearmed or retired [subs with nuked cruise missiles also not necessarily "tactical" and must concern NORAD].

Potentially, the Kalibr is a dual-capable cruise missile. Annually, Russia produces approximately 180 Kalibr-type missiles in various versions, including fewer than two dozen Kalibr-NK long-range cruise missiles. The Granit missiles will be replaced with conventional hypersonic Zirkon cruise missiles carried by ships and submarines. Most probably, the dual-capable torpedoes are being gradually replaced by new conventional torpedoes.

In all likelihood, only P-1000 Vulkan cruise missiles (Varyag, Marshal Ustinov and Moskva missile cruisers, 16 missiles each) capable of carrying warheads will be operational in the 2020s. Also, Nanuchka-class corvettes (12 missile ships) armed with dual-capable medium-range (of up to 150 km) Malakhit anti-ship cruise missiles will remain in service. However, it is doubtful that these missiles will carry nuclear warheads, given that they were initially designed for the Soviet Chaika (Charlie II) submarines...

De-escalation doctrine

Some experts question the very existence of this concept. However, as stipulated in Article 37 of The Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period until 2030, ‘During an escalation of military conflict, demonstration of readiness and determination to employ non-strategic nuclear weapons capabilities is an effective deterrent [emphasis added].’ Readiness to employ TNWs can be demonstrated by methods such as the simulation of a nuclear attack. In 2013, Russia simulated attacks on Sweden; in the case of real warfare, Russian forces could initially launch a demonstration nuclear strike in an uninhabited area, or a part of the ocean away from shipping routes. Russian long-range and anti-submarine aircraft would probably play the key role in such an operation [emphasis added].

On the one hand, the shrinking of the Russian TNW stockpile paradoxically lowers the threshold for its use, since the political leadership has the illusion of having control over the consequences [emphasis added]. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that American TNWs have largely been converted into political capital, which requires immense investments. Against the backdrop of the confrontation with the West, Moscow is tempted to devalue this capital. This can be done either by increasing pressure so that the Europeans demand the withdrawal of TNWs from their bases, or by putting forward a peace initiative for TNW withdrawals. The growing gap between the existing arsenal and non-operational stock could generate a spectacular effect if this initiative is accepted.
http://www.ridl.io/en/russias-tactical-nuclear-weapons-a-reality-check/

Not exactly re-assuring.  How will NORAD/USAF/RCAF cope?

Mark
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Ça explique, mais ça n'excuse pas.

Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]
« Reply #802 on: May 10, 2018, 14:59:30 »
From "Summary" of major report by Royal Institute of International Affairs:

Quote
Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027

While Western observers should be prepared to see Russia's armed forces become more capable over the next decade, they should avoid exaggerating the threat posed by these developments

Summary

 The newly approved state armament programme (GPV 2027) will form the basis of Russia’s defence procurement and military priorities until 2027. It is expected to build on the progress made under the previous programme, GPV 2020, and further strengthen and modernize the Russian armed forces.

 GPV 2020 helped revitalize sections of the Russian defence-industrial complex (OPK). New capital stock was installed, higher wages attracted younger and better-qualified workers, and production lines underwent a shift towards serial production of equipment for the first time in the post-Soviet era. This bodes well for GPV 2027. Some of the problems Russia encountered when developing and introducing weapons systems for GPV 2020 are likely to have been overcome by 2020. As a result, the defence industry looks set to start GPV 2027 from a much better position compared with where it started GPV 2020...

GPV 2027 will guide defence procurement and the modernization of the armed forces. The modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad is expected to remain a priority. While the navy is likely to receive less funding and prioritize the acquisition of smaller vessels, the ground forces can expect a larger share of funding than before. Meanwhile, the country’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) will probably concentrate on filling existing gaps in procurement (especially with regard to transport aircraft), as well as on boosting power-projection capabilities and force mobility. Air defence systems, and the honing of deterrence and anti-access capabilities, will probably keep playing an important part in military planning.

Implementation of GPV 2027 will necessarily be affected by external and internal factors. Issues such as production capabilities, adaptation and technological development will continue to present challenges for the military industry throughout the 2020s.

Key external factors will include ‘lessons learned’ from operational combat experience in Ukraine and Syria since 2014, as well as negative impacts of targeted international sanctions on Russia’s defence sector and from the breakdown of military cooperation with Ukraine since 2014. Technological and tactical adaptations that have been developed to mitigate these challenges are expected to drive the implementation of GPV 2027.
Internal factors will include the struggle to modernize military equipment, the need to increase the effort around military R&D, and the existence of long-term, unresolved issues relating to the internal workings of the defence industry. These critical shortcomings are likely to remain in place throughout the implementation of GPV 2027.

By 2027, the Russian armed forces are likely to be considerably better equipped than they are today. Nevertheless, one should not overstate the pace of probable modernization. While some progress may be made in the development of new-generation equipment, the armed forces will probably still rely on a mix of legacy hardware and modernized Soviet systems alongside new designs. Providing Russia with 21st-century military capabilities and adapting its armed forces to today’s challenges will require sustained investment in modernization efforts and military R&D.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russia-s-new-state-armament-programme-implications-russian-armed-forces-and-military

Mark
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Ça explique, mais ça n'excuse pas.

Offline Once_a_TQ

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Re: Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]
« Reply #803 on: May 16, 2018, 02:54:41 »
Little PAO info from today.

How Good Is Russia's Missile Defense? Israel Hit Moscow's Systems in Syria And Beat Them
http://www.newsweek.com/how-good-russias-missile-defense-israel-hit-moscows-systems-syria-and-beat-927563
(Newsweek, 15 May 18) Israeli strikes on targets in Syria last week took out several Russian missile defense systems and raised questions about the viability of Moscow’s military equipment.

US Intelligence Reports: Russia's New Hypersonic Weapon will Likely Be Ready for War by 2020
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-intelligence-reports-russias-new-hypersonic-weapon-will-likely-be-ready-for-war-by-2020/ar-AAxkKaZ
(CNBC, 15 May 18) A Russian weapon the U.S. is currently unable to defend against will be ready for war by 2020, according to sources with direct knowledge of American intelligence reports.


Offline CBH99

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Re: Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]
« Reply #804 on: May 16, 2018, 04:20:02 »
From "Summary" of major report by Royal Institute of International Affairs:

Mark
Ottawa


Nothing wrong with upgraded Soviet era equipment being used alongside the newer technology.  In many cases, I'd say this gives them a lot of benefits - older technology as a base doesn't necessarily mean it's poorer technology.  (One only has to look at the B-52 to see how older technology, when maintained and upgraded, can still be extremely relevant in modern times)

The use of their equipment is far more important than the improvements to the equipment itself, in my opinion.  A well deployed and skillfully operated T-72 or T-90 is a far bigger threat than a poorly positioned & operated Leopard 2A4 or Abrams (example, Turkey & Saudi Arabia)

Upgraded & more fuel efficient engines, upgraded fire control computers, upgraded ammunition types - Soviet era equipment isn't something to snub our noses at.   :2c:
Fortune Favours the Bold...and the Smart.

Wouldn't it be nice to have some Boondock Saints kicking around?

Offline MarkOttawa

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Re: Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]
« Reply #805 on: May 22, 2018, 16:48:26 »
Nice cruise missiles "tee hee":
Quote
Putin's 'unlimited range' nuclear missile crashed after 22 miles, US intelligence sources claim

The Kremlin has denied US claims that Russia's nuclear-powered cruise missile with “unlimited” range crashed after only 22 miles.

The weapon was one of a range of “invincible” nuclear arms announced by Vladimir Putin during a speech in March.

“Since its range is unlimited, it can manoeuvre as long as you want,” Mr Putin said. “For now, no one in the world has anything like this.”

But sources with direct knowledge of a US intelligence report told CNBC that four tests of the missile between November and February all resulted in crashes.

The longest flight lasted two minutes and covered 22 miles, while shortest ended only four seconds and five miles after launch, they said.

CNN previously quoted a US official as saying the cruise missile had crashed during tests...

After taking off with conventional fuel, the cruise missile is designed to be powered by a small nuclear reactor during flight.

Although Mr Putin had said the nuclear unit had successfully powered up and “provided the necessary level of thrust,” US intelligence claimed this component had failed to start.

Kremlin officials allegedly ordered the tests over objections from engineers that the weapon system was not ready.

The US intelligence report did not mention the health or environmental impacts potentially caused by damages to the missile's reactor.

Vladimir Putin first touted the cruise missile during a sabre-rattling March speech in which he said Russia had developed “invincible” nuclear arms including a glider warhead, hypersonic missile and underwater drone. One of the accompanying computer animations showed warheads raining down on Florida.

The “Dagger” hypersonic missiles Mr Putin mentioned were later displayed on the belly of MiG-31 jets roaring over Red Square during the annual Victory Day parade this month. 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-apos-apos-unlimited-range-123018369.html

More on hypersonics:

Quote
Russia Shows New Hypersonic Missile on Two MiG-31 Aircraft in Victory Day Rehearsals.


https://theaviationist.com/2018/05/05/russia-shows-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-on-two-mig-31-aircraft-in-victory-day-rehearsals/

Mark
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Ça explique, mais ça n'excuse pas.