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Helicopter/Cyclone discussion (split from HMCS Fredricton thread)

Now my head hurts. And I think I get it. All at once.

Thanks!!
There's a risk assessment/management process that kicks in to help mitigate terrible situations like this when they come up. We get tech/policy experts and operators together to identify the specific risk scenarios so the RCAF can make a call regarding continued use of platforms/systems.
The process helps to identify any specific flight profiles or manoeuvres that need to be avoided or adjusted and sets out deliverables to reduce or eliminate the risk wherever possible. We bring in as many stakeholders as necessary so the aircrew can 'hopefully' feel comfortable and trust their systems. It's not always easy.
 
I heard that you 146 guys fly IFR twice a year; the IRT and the retest.
🤣 Only old 136 VFR dinosaurs… 😉

147/135 dudes didn’t have many (any) issues…50 hrs of my actual was on a non-stabilized/non-George 135…I earned that Green Ticket! 😆
 
There's a risk assessment/management process that kicks in to help mitigate terrible situations like this when they come up. We get tech/policy experts and operators together to identify the specific risk scenarios so the RCAF can make a call regarding continued use of platforms/systems.
The process helps to identify any specific flight profiles or manoeuvres that need to be avoided or adjusted and sets out deliverables to reduce or eliminate the risk wherever possible. We bring in as many stakeholders as necessary so the aircrew can 'hopefully' feel comfortable and trust their systems. It's not always easy.
The Record of Airworthiness Risk Management (RARM) process however is very much a band aid until permanent solutions are in place (although we tend to rely on it in the long term). The Airworthiness Review Board sits twice a year to go through each fleet and their RARMs to give Comd RCAF an update on where things are for the higher profile ones (those assessed as Medium or higher risk).
 
The Record of Airworthiness Risk Management (RARM) process however is very much a band aid until permanent solutions are in place (although we tend to rely on it in the long term). The Airworthiness Review Board sits twice a year to go through each fleet and their RARMs to give Comd RCAF an update on where things are for the higher profile ones (those assessed as Medium or higher risk).
Sure, that's why I mentioned the establishment of deliverables (milestones if we're getting specific) to reduce/eliminate risk; it's a way to identify, mitigate and track issues to retain a capability while working the problem. I work in a section of the 148 WSM that manages RARMs and was on a recent RMT (more of a spectator, this one is well outside my lane) for the flight control logic issues behind the loss of 822. Some RARMs certainly do tend to linger for far too long and their use as a longer term tracking tool for certain ALOS items causes problems and unnecessary work.
 
Sure, that's why I mentioned the establishment of deliverables (milestones if we're getting specific) to reduce/eliminate risk; it's a way to identify, mitigate and track issues to retain a capability while working the problem. I work in a section of the 148 WSM that manages RARMs and was on a recent RMT (more of a spectator, this one is well outside my lane) for the flight control logic issues behind the loss of 822. Some RARMs certainly do tend to linger for far too long and their use as a longer term tracking tool for certain ALOS items causes problems and unnecessary work.
Well said, with the minor correction that risk can never be totally eliminated. For the non-RCAF folks reading this, ALOS means "acceptable level of safety". It's another way of saying "acceptable level of risk", in that there will always be a minimum level of safety that the airworthiness authorities (I worked in DTAES prior to my retirement Jan 2020. DTAES = Directorate of Technical Airworthiness and Engineering Support) will want to maintain. Go below that and flying is supposed to stop.
 
Well said, with the minor correction that risk can never be totally eliminated. For the non-RCAF folks reading this, ALOS means "acceptable level of safety". It's another way of saying "acceptable level of risk", in that there will always be a minimum level of safety that the airworthiness authorities (I worked in DTAES prior to my retirement Jan 2020. DTAES = Directorate of Technical Airworthiness and Engineering Support) will want to maintain. Go below that and flying is supposed to stop.
No, you certainly can't eliminate all risk as our good friends in DFS duly remind us each year. I hadn't meant to imply that all risk can be eliminated indefinitely, rather that a specific, identifiable risk can be eliminated for a short period such as a cease flying order or the suspension of use for a particular system/tool in certain cases. In the short-term, the decision can be made to put a hard stop on something and in that sense we'd be eliminating a specific risk for a fixed period. Hopefully, once we've come up with a game plan we can get operations back to the same level of confidence they were at before the accident/incident. We've been hogging quite a bit of SME bandwidth from the DTAES folks in the 148 shop, I'm sure they've had their fill of us by now.
 
Apparently this is a Chilean Cougar with Exocet missiles. does it make sense to have a anti-ship missile function on Marine helicopters today?

218144870_10223111775001569_3901745272949060034_n.jpg
 
Apparently this is a Chilean Cougar with Exocet missiles. does it make sense to have a anti-ship missile function on Marine helicopters today?

View attachment 65812
I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.

And what is target acquisition like? Helo will certainly be in range of AAM on any ship that they can acquire on their own.

Again, neophyte here. Please weigh in NWO's.
 
I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.

And what is target acquisition like? Helo will certainly be in range of AAM on any ship that they can acquire on their own.

Again, neophyte here. Please weigh in NWO's.
Seconding this.
 
I don't know much about Exocets, but hopefully, the missiles drop before they ignite, otherwise, lots of maintenance.

And what is target acquisition like? Helo will certainly be in range of AAM on any ship that they can acquire on their own.

Again, neophyte here. Please weigh in NWO's.

The part of your post I've highlighted was/is not always the case. And based on the trends I see in naval weapon development, I see the advantage tipping towards the surface platform going forward, so we're likely to see the helo-launched anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) fall even further out of favour than it already is.

Broadly speaking, naval SAMs can be classified into two categories: Area Air Defence (AAD) and Point Defence. In a classic naval task group concept, at least one ship will be an AAD platform, designed to be able to protect the entire TG against air threats because its missiles are sufficiently long-ranged. A point defence SAM is a short range missile generally designed to only protect the ship they're carried in from air threats.

If we look at common ASCMs, say a Harpoon or Exocet, Wikipedia says we're looking at a ~110 NM range for air-launched variants. A common point defence SAM like the Sea Sparrow has a range of about 10 NM. An AAD SAM like the SM-2 can reach out to about 100NM.

Air-based surface search radars are pretty good, again thanks to the advantage of altitude. This Leonardo radar claims a surveillance range of 200NM, so theoretically a helo carrying ASCMs could organically target and fire upon a ship in a TG without being able to be counter fired upon.

So why isn't every navy in the world using helo-launched ASCMs to increase their offensive range? My guess is that this is primarily due to weight/range limitations of the helo. Missiles are super heavy, and each time you load one onto an aircraft you're paying a significant range/endurance price. By the time you've loaded two, flown far enough away to get within weapons release range of the enemy (assuming you don't waste gas searching because you don't know exactly where they are), and fire, you probably have to return home almost immediately. You have no guarantee that 1-2 missiles is going to be effective against a modern defensive suite on your target, and now the enemy probably knows exactly where your force is because the helo probably had to fly in a nearly straight line from blue to red based off the fuel limitations.

Extended range missiles seem to be the name of the game moving forward. Russia is developing Zircon, a hypersonic ASCM which they claim has a range of ~550-1100 NM. China is claiming that new variants of the HQ-9 SAM have a range of over 160 NM. This is going to put the nail in the coffin of the helo as a viable ASCM launch platform IMO (at least in a peer-to-peer conflict, some countries might continue to use them to attack less capable ships or shore targets without GBAD).
 
An Exocet or Harpoon might be a step too far but lots of helicopters are armed with smaller anti-ship or surface missiles
 
This ends up being an arms race where the range and target acquisition capabilities of opposing weapon systems will keep increasing until one side or the other finally develops such an effective anti-missile system that none can get through.

Since anti-ship missiles and air defence missiles are fairly sophisticated already one would think that using an anti-ship missile carrying helicopter is just one more launch platform to join the range of existing ships and aircraft so that your launch systems are more dispersed than they would ordinarily be. Of the three I would think that the helicopter currently probably has the least self-defence capability.

🍻
 
The part of your post I've highlighted was/is not always the case. And based on the trends I see in naval weapon development, I see the advantage tipping towards the surface platform going forward, so we're likely to see the helo-launched anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) fall even further out of favour than it already is.

Broadly speaking, naval SAMs can be classified into two categories: Area Air Defence (AAD) and Point Defence. In a classic naval task group concept, at least one ship will be an AAD platform, designed to be able to protect the entire TG against air threats because its missiles are sufficiently long-ranged. A point defence SAM is a short range missile generally designed to only protect the ship they're carried in from air threats.

If we look at common ASCMs, say a Harpoon or Exocet, Wikipedia says we're looking at a ~110 NM range for air-launched variants. A common point defence SAM like the Sea Sparrow has a range of about 10 NM. An AAD SAM like the SM-2 can reach out to about 100NM.

Air-based surface search radars are pretty good, again thanks to the advantage of altitude. This Leonardo radar claims a surveillance range of 200NM, so theoretically a helo carrying ASCMs could organically target and fire upon a ship in a TG without being able to be counter fired upon.

So why isn't every navy in the world using helo-launched ASCMs to increase their offensive range? My guess is that this is primarily due to weight/range limitations of the helo. Missiles are super heavy, and each time you load one onto an aircraft you're paying a significant range/endurance price. By the time you've loaded two, flown far enough away to get within weapons release range of the enemy (assuming you don't waste gas searching because you don't know exactly where they are), and fire, you probably have to return home almost immediately. You have no guarantee that 1-2 missiles is going to be effective against a modern defensive suite on your target, and now the enemy probably knows exactly where your force is because the helo probably had to fly in a nearly straight line from blue to red based off the fuel limitations.

Extended range missiles seem to be the name of the game moving forward. Russia is developing Zircon, a hypersonic ASCM which they claim has a range of ~550-1100 NM. China is claiming that new variants of the HQ-9 SAM have a range of over 160 NM. This is going to put the nail in the coffin of the helo as a viable ASCM launch platform IMO (at least in a peer-to-peer conflict, some countries might continue to use them to attack less capable ships or shore targets without GBAD).

On the other hand, if your helicopter force was based on an atoll in the Spratly Islands...
 
The "shooter" doesn't always have to be in the MEZ (Missile Engagement Zone) of the target. Think OTHT (Over The Horizon Targeting).

A helo taking out an enemy heavy, or crippling it, is a cheap price to pay in a shooting war, if that helo is lost. Like taking a tank out in battle, it can be easier to take out the supporting (softer skin) echelon vehs. Take out the oiler...

AA RADARs, even on a mast of a surface ship....they're going to have a fairly small "surface level" RADAR horizon. No mast mounted RADAR is seeing 200nm...they aren't "horizon huggers"; an airborne RADAR has to be fairly high to achieve 200nm eff detection and tracking.

Helo's can also "pop up/acquire/shoot/drop down"....they can egress their launch point fairly quickly compared to skimmers/submerged folks.

I think our MHs and LRP should all be "shooters". Every single one of them....we need the punch.
 
Extended range missiles seem to be the name of the game moving forward. Russia is developing Zircon, a hypersonic ASCM which they claim has a range of ~550-1100 NM. China is claiming that new variants of the HQ-9 SAM have a range of over 160 NM. This is going to put the nail in the coffin of the helo as a viable ASCM launch platform IMO (at least in a peer-to-peer conflict, some countries might continue to use them to attack less capable ships or shore targets without GBAD).
They just announced a successful launch. Nice looking ship
 
This Leonardo radar claims a surveillance range of 200NM, so theoretically a helo carrying ASCMs could organically target and fire upon a ship in a TG without being able to be counter fired upon.

I just wanted to add a point on this; the (theoretical) RADAR horizon at 25,000' is...194nm. I say theoretical because of course, it could be slightly better (ducting/inversion layers, etc), or worse. The same goes with passive systems like...EOIR (also a possible targeting sensor).

ESM horizons are greater than RADAR horizons. General rule; you will/can be detected before you detect.

I'm no tactics expert; but I'd personally like the idea of someone giving me target info passively (not Link 11!) off their RADAR...and me minimizing any kind of Tx. Especially if my EGRESS is sub-sonic.

General speaking, I'd say think of "MH RADAR" working in the 120nm and minus range, max, for detection/tracking based on a 10,000' max alt.

Various radars will also have a maximum instrumented range; limited by technologies. Those are not likely going to be open source.

** anyone who knows the ranges of the CP-140 or CH-148....they aren't going to post them, myself included.
 
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I can see expendable drone boats emitting strong EM signals for a task group forced to close on a hostile coast.
 
Just wondering what purpose you see them doing? An Electronic Attack mission to 'jam' coastal sensors...or more a la the KELT missiles in Red Storm Rising (if you read that one)?
 
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