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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

Chief Stoker said:
Properly maintained and upgraded ships and air frames can last for many years.

Very true.  The submarines are the example that the surface ships are now using for material management.  They are extremely well monitored and taken care of, probably because of their past issues.  The current submarines are in excellent shape.


Uzlu said:
They have been lightly used.
Uzlu said:
Not rust.  The number of dive-and-surface cycles that stresses the submarine’s hull.

Very true, repetitive loading is the main issue here, like bending a paperclip back and forth (for those of you who are not aware of material issues... apologies to those who are for sounding "know it all" like).  NETE is developing new testing techniques to look for internal stress cracks in the pressure hull so we don't have a Montreal idler gear type situation.  Those subs are lavished with attention from a material perspective due to SUBSAFE requirements (and rightly so).
 
Interestingly, submarines and airplanes share many similarities regarding fatigue life - many (pressurized) aircraft have their lifetime measured in ‘cycles’, which includes a complete pressurization cycle from ambient surface pressure to a specified ‘cabin otessure’ while at cruise altitude (usually 8,000 MSL for most) and a return to ambient surface pressure.  The major difference being aircraft physically expand slightly during each pressurization cycle due to reduced atmospheric pressure at altitude, while submarines experience compressive pressure cycling during their dive cycles.  In both cases, the repeated tensile or compressive cycling fatigues the main structure as well as fittings and external connectors, leading to the use of remaining structural life.

Of course, if you inadvertently apply excessive pressure cycles to such structures, either in tension for planes, or compression for subs, things don’t go well...to wit: (below)
 

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And planes only have to deal with, as an obvious maximum, changes in pressure of one atmosphere.

At 800 feet, a submarine is subjected to 25 atmosphere of pressure. That's one of the reason there is no sound really associated with the airplane body going through the cycle, while submarines' hulls and pressure fittings creak during the process - particularly during an emergency dive or surfacing. It's a noise that takes some getting use to.

 
https://www.marinelink.com/news/shipbuilding-seaspan-shipyards-building-440822

here’s a shipbuilding resurgence underway in Canada that’s being driven by a long-term multibillion dollar government initiative to rebuild the federal fleet of Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard vessels and breathe new life into the country’s shipbuilding industry. Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards is an active player.
Under Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), the Vancouver, B.C. shipbuilder was selected in 2011 to deliver several types of large non-combat vessels for the Navy and Coast Guard, while another shipyard on the East Coast, Irving Shipbuilding, will deliver the combat ships. The NSS also calls for a number of smaller vessels from several other yards throughout Canada.
Vancouver Rising
Seaspan Shipyards won the open competitive bid to build non-combat vessels over 1,000 gross tons in Vancouver. That backlog currently includes three Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels (OFSV), one Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel (OOSV) and one Polar Class Icebreaker for the Canadian Coast Guard, plus two Joint Support Ships (JSS) for the Royal Canadian Navy. The company anticipates further work on non-combat vessels to be defined by its federal customer in the coming years.
This current and future activity is revitalizing an entire industry by creating new work up and down the shipbuilding supply chain. To date, thanks to its NSS-related work alone, Seaspan has $600 million in committed contracts and engaged approximately 500 Canadian firms, the vast majority of which are small- and medium-sized enterprises.
“The National Shipbuilding Strategy is causing a rebirth of shipbuilding on the West Coast, simply put,” said Tim Page, Vice president of Government Relations at Seapsan Shipyards. “We have not had a backlog of work ever such as we have today, nor have we had the promise of that backlog of work because there has not been a federal, national commitment to a long-term strategic recapitalization program for our maritime forces probably since the Second World War.”Prior to the NSS, the shipyard had mostly built tugs, barges and ferries. “Currently, we have three active and concurrent and shipbuilding programs underway, which is a rarity in North American shipbuilding,” Page said. Seaspan is well into the program to produce the three fisheries science vessels, and in June it began building the first of two joint support ships. The yard is also designing, planning and procuring long-lead items for our oceanographic science vessel. Work to produce a polar icebreaker is also due to join the mix.


‘Considerable Risk’
Balancing such a workload has its challenges. “It’s a portfolio that includes considerable risk, given the soft-toothed nature of program – three vessels, one, then two, then one,” Page explained. “So, over the first seven vessels that we will be producing here at Vancouver Shipyards, there will be four prototypes, which is a pretty tall order for an industry that has recently been reborn.”
“The federal government has decided that the best way of managing the program in the year to years is to have a series of contracts for each project. So, for the fisheries science vessel we have four separate contracts: an ancillary contract to get us started; engineering contract to do all the design and engineering – preproduction, if you will; a long-lead item contract that allows us to go to market to acquire vendor furnished information, to mature design work and ultimately get costing so that we can have a pretty good idea what it’s going to cost to build the ship so that the government can then get us under contract to build.”
“We don’t have build contracts for the oceanographic science vessel yet,” Page said, “and we have no formal contracts for our polar icebreaker program yet, nor do we have anything but a commitment by our federal government to build up to 10 additional vessels after we’ve completed the polar icebreaker.” The build schedule will ultimately be determined by federal government demand, he explained: “We see this as a 20-year build program. It’s for [the government] to decide how they want to manage that.”
An Ecosystem of Suppliers
All the while, an expanding pool of suppliers is pitching in with Seaspan for the long-term endeavor. “The Canadian market is keenly interested in supporting us,” Page said. “They are, like we, inexperienced in the business by virtue of not having built any large vessels in this country for 30 years. So, we’re all learning together; we’re all in the same classroom, if you will, all trying to figure out how to anticipate our federal customer’s needs, and then how to procure those needs in a timely, cost-effective, quality-driven perspective.”
“That supply base is growing with every successive program that we engage in with our federal government,” Page said. “We’re creating an ecosystem, if you will, that will sustain the efforts of Vancouver Shipyards and responding to the demand of our customer for a long, strategic build program.”
The Canadian government estimates that contracts awarded through the NSS (overall, not just at Seaspan) have contributed some $7.7 billion to the nation’s gross domestic product and create or maintain an average of more than 7,000 jobs per year.
Seaspan Invests
With the promise of steady work through the NSS, Seaspan has invested heavily in its facilities and staff required for the large-scale, long-term project. In 2014, the shipyard completed a two-year $170 million modernization program that included the addition of a very large gantry crane (named Hiyí Skwáyel, the Squamish language translation of “Big Blue”), four fabrication buildings and a load-out pier. “We’ve created here, in our opinion, the most modern shipyard of its kind in North America,” Page said. Additionally, in April this year, Seaspan opened a new 7,800 square meter office next to its yard that will serve primarily as a collaborative space for Vancouver Shipyards to execute preproduction work under the NSS.
With a project of this magnitude also comes demand for a new and larger talent pool. “We are heavily invested in universities, colleges and trade schools. We’re directly invested and indirectly training, and then we’re hoping that graduates of those programs will look at Seaspan Shipyards as a place to earn a well-paid salary and live a productive and enjoyable work experience,” Page said. “We’re also attracting a number of welders, pipe fitters, steel fabricators from the oil and gas sector which is currently experiencing a downturn in Alberta. They’re certified tradespeople, but they have no relative experience building ships. So, we’ve got an active on-the-job training of our blue-collar workforce. And we’re training through apprentices and internships in that respect, as well as in the white-collar area.”
“Given the absence of shipbuilding in Canada and shipbuilding on the West Coast for 30 years, people hadn’t been looking to careers in shipbuilding or ship repair,” Page said. “We’re helping to change that but recognize that we have a responsibility to mature that workforce on a faster pace than simply through the formal education system.”
Progress and Lessons Learned.
“As we’re managing a relationship with two different federal customers, figuring out how to flex the muscles of our newly-built shipyard, attracting and training a largely green workforce on both the trade side and the white-collar staff side, and developing a domestic supply chain isn’t used to building ships in this country for the last 30 years, there are considerable risks in all of that. And we are living those risks in real time,” Page said.
The first large vessel designed and built under the NSS, the lead of the three new OFSVs, was launched behind schedule near the end of 2017. “I think the schedule estimates were optimistic when they were first created, in part out of a political imperative to get the shipbuilding strategy underway,” Page said. “We were willing partners in that optimism because we’re very proud of having won the competition, very proud of the work done here in a very short number of years to rebuild Canada’s shipbuilding industry here on the West Coast and to be attracting and training as many young Canadians from diverse backgrounds as we have been able to.”
The milestone vessel, the 63-meter CCGS Sir John Franklin, was launched December 8, 2017. Together with its two sister ships currently under construction, the vessels will replace three aged Coast Guard vessels that are used for research to better understand the health of fish stocks and their ocean environment.
“A first-of-class vessel in a new shipyard always has a myriad of lessons to be learned from it, which we are now applying to the construction of the second and third vessels in that same class. A whole lot in the operations side and the production side, but whole lot as well in the engineering, planning and program management side has been learned. And we’re now applying those lessons learned to our downstream work for the oceanographic science vessel and joint support ship.”
On June 15, Seaspan held a steel cutting ceremony for the first JSS. The new ships will deliver fuel and other supplies to vessels at sea in support of the Navy’s defense and humanitarian missions. They’ll also offer medical/dental facilities and provide support for helicopter operations and equipment repair. Once completed, the 173-meter vessels will be among the largest ships ever constructed on Canada’s West Coast.
 
Good2Golf said:
Interestingly, submarines and airplanes share many similarities regarding fatigue life - many (pressurized) aircraft have their lifetime measured in ‘cycles’, which includes a complete pressurization cycle from ambient surface pressure to a specified ‘cabin otessure’ while at cruise altitude (usually 8,000 MSL for most) and a return to ambient surface pressure.  The major difference being aircraft physically expand slightly during each pressurization cycle due to reduced atmospheric pressure at altitude, while submarines experience compressive pressure cycling during their dive cycles.  In both cases, the repeated tensile or compressive cycling fatigues the main structure as well as fittings and external connectors, leading to the use of remaining structural life.

Of course, if you inadvertently apply excessive pressure cycles to such structures, either in tension for planes, or compression for subs, things don’t go well...to wit: (below)


Wowa!!!!  How did that thing not fall out of the sky??  That's scary.  Really scary.  Enjoy your next Air Canada flight folks...
 
CBH99 said:
Wowa!!!!  How did that thing not fall out of the sky??  That's scary.  Really scary.  Enjoy your next Air Canada flight folks...

It wasn't flying.  They were conducting a pressurization test, the outflow valves were capped and it wasn't realized, and the tech misread the gauge.

More pictures and a lessons learned slide at https://www.powershow.com/view/131712-MTk0Z/KC135_PRESSURIZATION_MISHAP_powerpoint_ppt_presentation?varnishcache=1, but it is not a definitive source.  Accident report at https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19990407-2

More scary is that aircraft was over 40 years old at the time of the mishap in *1999*.  They are still flying KC-135s; granted maybe not the oldest ones. But according to https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2015/11/23/grueling-pace-for-old-planes-tankers-and-their-maintainers-cant-afford-to-slow-down/ the average age was 55 years in 2005.  How many pressurization cycles does that represent?

For an incident caused by incorrect maintenance to the pressure fuselage occurring in flight see https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/human_factors_maintenance/aircraft_accident_report--aloha_airlines.flight_243.boeing_737-200.n73711.near_maui.hawaii.april_28.1988.pdf

 
You think the PAO's office would be experts on stuff like spelling.......

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Not sure that this is the proper thread, but found this interesting article...

https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/navy-blues#
 
From seaspan twitter

Seaspan Shipyards is pleased to announce the achievement of an important milestone on the CCGS Sir John Franklin. Last week saw the successful running of the vessel’s main diesel generators. The ship will now progress into full load trials.

From their webpage, OFSV #3

http://www.seaspan.com/nss-progress-galleries/nss-photo-gallery-ofsv3
 
DeWolf for Coast guard? if there is a gap between construction of 5 navy DeWolf's and Type 26 construction, could that gap be filled by building 1 or 2 DeWolf's for CCG, would DeWolf's be of any use to CCG ice-breaking in St. Lawrence etc? 
 
ringo said:
DeWolf for Coast guard? if there is a gap between construction of 5 navy DeWolf's and Type 26 construction, could that gap be filled by building 1 or 2 DeWolf's for CCG, would DeWolf's be of any use to CCG ice-breaking in St. Lawrence etc?

No
DeWolf can operate in ice but AFAIK she would not be able to break the ice found in the St. Lawrence.
 
Plus she can't really do buoy tending. They could be easily modified to do science work. CCG generally hates non-multi-tasked vessels. I doubt they really wanted the Hero class which is basically going back to a slightly more capable R-Class. They didn't waste time getting rid of one of the 500 class (John Jacobson) leaving one left in service (Gordon Reid).
 
Quebec's Davie shipyard to split billion-dollar ship maintenance contracts

Quebec's Davie shipyard is in line to get a piece of federal contracts worth billions of dollars for maintenance on Canadian navy ships.



Looks like wiser heads are prevailing and realizing, though not fully, that Irving and Seaspan don't have enough idle capacity to maintain the existing fleet and attempt to build out the new one.  This will again play out with the Kingston's finally give up the ghost
and the Victoria's need they're life extension in another few years. Davie will again come to the forefront.

Public Services and Procurement Canada announced Thursday in a news release it intends to sign contracts worth $7 billion with Davie, in Lévis, Que., Irving Shipbuilding Inc. in Halifax and Seaspan Victoria Shipyards in Victoria.

The government did not provide a breakdown of how much each contract is worth.

However, a source told Radio-Canada it would be the biggest contract in Davie's history.....

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/davie-shipyard-contract-1.4887200
 
A scenario, interested in seeing your thoughts/solutions:

You run the re-re-started shipbuilding strategy.

A protracted legal battle causes a delay in awarding the CSC contract. The shipyard will lay off hundreds unless another contract for something else is signed. The gov't of the day is eager not to lose jobs in a politically vital region, to prove itself in the shipbuilding industry, and to show the strategy is working. There is now an expected 2 year gap (don't focus on why). The shipyard cannot start to build anything for the CSC as the contract can't be awarded yet. Cabinet supports your solution to get this shipyard working asap, cost is not the biggest factor anymore (jobs/time are).

Rules:

You can't pre-build anything for the CSC.
Nothing can be built in large numbers, as the gap is 2 years at most (unless you scrap the CSC project).
Re-tooling the shipyard is not an issue (for ****s and giggles).
You may change the strategy, but cannot cancel classes already being built.

What do you suggest and why?
 
I'm no specialist, but since Irving is picking the pace with AOPS, why not a 7th?  it might be too much to call it a "spare" one, but having 3 on each side of the country at all time might be hard, maintenance, refit, problems, the 7th could fit the gap when one is in dry dock?
 
Contract Davies to convert another Freighter (to shut them up) and then sole source a RO RO to work as a delivery vessel for the army when required.  Lease it out for commercial use with a recall provision.  That way we get a supply ship capable of transporting to Europe or elsewhere, keep everyone working at Irving and keep Davie happy all at the same time and it is a resource that we don't have at all right now.  There are lots of commercially available plans to ensure that no expensive re-engineering is required and it should make for a fairly quick build.
 
Yup. “Encourage” unsolicited bids to fund ideas that address capability gaps for non CSC naval duties.  Perhaps a 800 foot through deck tug boat, a peace support “ferry” and lease some “surplus” yet to be built FFG ships from the US.
 
Commission from Irving, on a sole source contract, two (heck, maybe even three if they can squeeze it) brand spanking new HALIFAX class frigates with full "mid-life" refit upgrades already on them.

Irving or the GoC already own all the rights and plans needed to do that and you would have brand new hulls ready to be the ones that will go on in a reasonable shape until they become the last ones replaced by the CSC's.

Wait! Won't work. It's too logical.
 
yep just move the builder plates to the new hull and any beams with a registry number. That would be like almost every flying Beaver out here, an old plate with new parts surrounding it. When the CSC is finally built, sell the old/new Halifax's to a 3rd world country.
 
LoboCanada said:
A scenario, interested in seeing your thoughts/solutions:

You run the re-re-started shipbuilding strategy.

A protracted legal battle causes a delay in awarding the CSC contract. The shipyard will lay off hundreds unless another contract for something else is signed. The gov't of the day is eager not to lose jobs in a politically vital region, to prove itself in the shipbuilding industry, and to show the strategy is working. There is now an expected 2 year gap (don't focus on why). The shipyard cannot start to build anything for the CSC as the contract can't be awarded yet. Cabinet supports your solution to get this shipyard working asap, cost is not the biggest factor anymore (jobs/time are).

Rules:

You can't pre-build anything for the CSC.
Nothing can be built in large numbers, as the gap is 2 years at most (unless you scrap the CSC project).
Re-tooling the shipyard is not an issue (for ****s and giggles).
You may change the strategy, but cannot cancel classes already being built.

What do you suggest and why?


I present my argument from the other thread....


CSC will be cancelled due to the delays, court-cases, and excessive costs (not including any space for overruns)
GOC will contract with ISI to instead build an additional 15 modified AOPS
AOPS design will be modified for last 15 ships to include the new SG-180 upgrade that we just bought for the Halifax class, a slightly upgraded OPS room with a better DLPS (Digital Link) system and an improved armament suite to include a 40mm or 57mm deck gun (preferably 57mm with no ammo hoist - you get the 120 rounds in the mount then have to manually reload) and a set of triple Torp Tubes on each side.  For ASW, they'd add the ability to mount a containerized ASW towed array system.


Presto.  We have a simplified fleet of 21 ships - all of the same type.  It lets them throw a bunch of money at LM as a 'sympathy' response for losing the CSC to enable the redesign of the OPS room and tie in the SG-180. 


From the perspective of the RCN - horrible loss of capability.
From the perspective of the GOC - we get the same number of ships, but a lot less cost
From the perspective of the Public - they don't know what we do anyhow, so it's a win win.



 
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